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The only way out of' thes� epistemological dif'f'icult ies 
is (I say )  giving up the analyt ical ideal . 
( St ephen E .Toulmin ) .  
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The Topic. 
To the question "What do you see? " one answer would be "I 
see the lighthouse" . To the question "What do you hear? " an 
answer could be ' I hear a car" .  To the question "What do you 
smell ? "  an answer could be "I smell the ripenes s o:f the :fruit " .  
To the quest ion o:f "What do you taste? " an answer might be "An 
excellent Beauj olais" . To the question o:f "What do you feel?"  
an answer could be  "That the bathwat er i s  hot"· 
"Seeing" , "hearing" , and 1 1  smelling" , "tast ing" , and "feeling". 
are act ivities that often are referred to under the common head­
ing of "perceiving" .  The only t echnicality of my use of "perceiv­
ing" i s  the one of l inguist ic economy. 
Accordingly all of the answer s in the first paragraph 
might be called perceptual statement s .  It seems to me that all 
these perc eptual statement s could be appropriat e  answers to the 
questions , respect ively , and further that when made in certain 
c ircumstances they are true , while , of course , in others they 
would be false .  When they ar e  made in circumstances where they 
are true they form part of what could be called perc eptual know­
ledge , that i s, we know something about the lighthouse that is  
locat ed there and ther e ;  we know something about what happened 
there and there at a c ertain t ime ; &c . ,  &c . •  
In a way corresponding to these distinctions I shall speak 
of our perception as ' veridical ' in the cases where our perc eptual 
statements are true; and in cas es where our perc eptual statements 
are false , of non-veridical perc eption . Thus it will be natural· 
and correct to say that the facts I perc eive veridically comprise 
our perceptual knowledge , while on the other hand what we take 
t o  be facts but of which we have spec ific knowledge whether per­
ceptual or not , contradicting such perc eptual statements fall 
outs ide that class . 
However , it i s ,  if not often , at least sometimes the case 
that our perceptual statements are false . Throughout the history 
of philosophy this fact has induced philosophers to pres ent 
reasonings of  the following kind . Sinc e our ordinary perc eptual 
statements sometimes are wrong , .  they must go beyond what we 
actually perc eive , beyond what. really constitutes the testimony 
of our senses .  It i s  also a fact that there are cases where 
different persons ' concurrent perceptions of what we commonly 
suppo se to be the same thing seems to contradict each other . 
Thi s fact has been thought to present a ground for arguments 
challenging the.validity of our perceptual knowledge . 
Admittedly , .such facts seems to form a problem. Apart from 
physiological questions about the way our s enses function and 
psychological questions , for instance , about how learning , 
feelings , interests and expectations influence what we perceive , 
2. 
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there i s  also , founded on the above fact s a philosophical question . 
· The question that could be called the question of the philosophy 
of perception. Put quit e generally it is : What i s  it we perceive? 
Philosophers have dealt with this quest ion in many differ.ent 
ways . It seems , however , that they all can be trac ed back to the 
tradit ional epist emological endeavour of justifying our empirical 
knowledge . By ' empirical knowledge ' I mean , tautologically 
speaking ,  the knowledge we pos sess  via perception in contrast to 
the knowledge , if any , in the obtainment of which perc eption is not 
involved . It i s  thus obvious that this question is. of vital inter� 
est for all philosophers whether they hold or are in oppo sit ion to 
empiricism.  
a. Once there was a tough-minded philosopher who answered 
this question short and clearly : we perc eive nothing but our 
own ideas ; let me call him an idealist . His answer obviously 
eliminates the puzzles that gave r ise to the question. Thus 
there is  no contradict ion in saying that two persons perceive 
two different ideas concurrently ,  in fact he has to maintain that 
this  has to be so . Nor is  there anything inconsistent in main­
taining that one person at different t imes perceives different 
ideas . In fact the idealist has good reason to assume that thi s 
i s  the case all the t ime . And with all the empirical evidenc e 
in his favor , he can even maintain that sinc e everything happens 
as it does , whether we assume the exi st ence of anything el se than 
our own ideas , and it i s  a good methodological principle not to 
multiply the number of entities beyond what is nec essary , thi s  
i s  the answer we were looking for . 
Now apart from the difficulties the idealist has to face in 
the philosophy of mind , in ontology , &c . ,  he clearly has some 
quite severe difficulties in meet ing the most elementary part s 
of our common sense views on perception . For instance , it i s ,  I 
take it , ordinarily perfectly true in certain c ircumstances  that 
persons perc eive their own bodies . The typical idealist will of 
cour se answer that this  is so because statement s about our bodies 
are stat ement s about nothing but bundles of ideas . But , first , 
thi s  seems to imply that what ever idea I might perceive of my 
own body , it is true , which certainly i s  a peculiar implicat ion . 
Next and wor se , the idealist destroys quite a few of our common 
sense distinctions : for instance ,  he is  unable to distinguish 
between my body and whatever I at a certain t ime perceive . That 
i s  severe indeed because here are two fact s about the world which 
4 .  
he cannot talk about separately. It might seem a little too easy, 
1 
but I consider thi s argument decisive against idealism 
b. Qnce there was another philosopher who answered the 
quest ion pretty much the way I sketched in the first paragraph ; 
let me call him a realist . Hi s answer obviously eliminates the 
1 .  Cf.  my section on Revisionism� pp. 90-94 ; and pp . l4-18 . 
puzzles ,  too . He maintains that of cour se our perceptual state-
ment s somet imes are false,  in·fact it would be awkward to say as 
does the idealist above ,  that the changes we are subj ect to in 
this  world had no influence on our perception at all . And , of 
cour se ,  it i s  impossible for two persons to have prec isely the 
same perception at the same t ime ,  because it would be just as 
awkward if circumstanc es , such as a person ' s  spat ial locat ion , 
had no influence on his perc eption . In fact we know of some per-
sons that are color-blind , for instanc e ,  who could not possibly 
have the same percept ions as persons with full color-vision � 
Now it is  point ed out to the realist that these answers are 
not without difficulties . We might ask, for example ,  does that 
mean that all perc eptual statement s are true , and , if not , which 
are ? And even if the real ist can account satisfactorily for 
such differenc es , the idealist would ask further what are these 
bodies that you from t ime to time speak of ? Somet imes we even 
5-
perceive things of that kind where there are none , what is  it then 
1. Many writer s on this topic deal almost exclusively with vi sion . 
Although this i s  obj ect ionable ( cf. e . g .  pp . 37-38 ) I shall do 
so myself in many cases ; my j ustification is that I shall make 
no claim that the conclusions reached are generalisazable to 
perception as such. Further I shall make an effort not to use 
'perc eiving ' as synonymous with the act ivity of only one sense , 
but in such case always spec ificaly use 'seeing ' ,  'hearing' , &c • •  
I shall not deal with the difficulties in distinguishing between 
the senses , which is  a seldom recognized question although pre­
sented already by Aristotle , ( cf .  Richard Sorabj i :  Ari stotle on 
Demarcat ing the Five Senses , Philosophical Review , 1971 ; H . P .  
Grice :  Some remarks about the senses , in Analytical Philosophy , 
Fir st· series , ed . Butler , Oxford ,  1962 ; J . W .  Roxbee Cox : Dist ing­
uishing the Senses , Mind , 1970 ) . 
other than an idea we are perceiving? So it is said that. realism 
is an unsatis�actorY, position in some respect s .  
6 .  
c. There i s ,  however , a third philosopher who as the two 
above , represent s a great tradition in philosophy and who o��er s 
an answer to the question int ended to overcome the di��icult ies 
that seem to meet the others ; let me call him a phenomenalist . 
The typical phenomenalist answers the quest ion somewhat like thi s : 
what we perceive are special sense-obj ect s .  The phenomenalist is  
particularly tough-minded in that with his compromise , he tries 
to gain advantage over both the reali st and idealist posit ion , 
and at the same time to avoid their di��iculties . Thus he dis­
poses o� the above puzzles by saying , like the idealist , that two 
persons perceive two sense-obj ect s  concurrently and , like the 
realist , that they obviously could not perceive the same sense­
obj ect . Likewi se it is  plausible that a person perceive s di�­
�erent sense-obj ect s  at di��erent times , namely concurrently with 
changes in c ircumstances . 
Dissolut ions to the puz zles along such lines clearly commit 
the phenomenalist to certain views about the nature o� sense� 
obj ect s - views that are unacc eptable to both idealist s  and realist s ,  
such as that we do not perceive things , that what we do perceive 
bas no spat ial and temporal locat ion , that perceptual knowledge i s  
derivative , &c • •  Phenomenalism thus carries di��iculties o� it ' s  
own . 
7 .  
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For a long time , at least sinc e Descart es , many phrlosophers 
have believed that this third answer is the right answer to the pro-
blem of perception ; what was needed , according to them, vas to work 
out a satisfactory account of the nature of sense-obj ect s , and many 
different such att empt s have been made . I do not share this belief , 
in fact I am writing here not to praise these attempt s ,  but to bury 
them. I shall do so by examining the features that sense-obj ect s 
and theories including such obj ect s necessarily must have in order 
to constitute an alt ernative answer to the realist ' s . MY conclusion 
wtll be that no attempt of this type could be suc�essful . Now in 
order to carry out this proj ect within a reasonable spac e and with 
decisive forc e I do not int end to examine all the various answer s 
that have been given , but , as I said , only the necessary .part s of 
this type of att empt . Before proc eeding with a sketch of how I find 
it possible to delineate the way certain forms of this type can be 
dismissed , two things should be noted at this stage • .  
2 
One significant differenc e between the three types of  answer s 
I have referred to is that on the one hand the · idealist and the phe-
1 .  Descartes held a causal theory , where the "affect ions of our mind'' 
from both "internal and external" senses , are called "perceptions 
of the senses" or just "sensat ions" , which are Haldane and Ro ss ' 
translation of sensum peraeptiones and sensus� sive sensationes. 
E . g . Princ iples of Philosophy , Part IV , no . CLXXXIX-CXCVII , in 
The Philosophical Works of Descartes , Cambridge , 1911 . 
2 .  I have cho sen to neglect a type of answer that could be called 
mat erialist ic ; that is , what we perceive is-material obj ect s ,  im­
plying that whenever we perceive something that is not a material 
obj ect we are subj ect to illusions .  I choo se to do so because I 
do not know of anything that could be said in it s favor , nor do 
I know of anyone who has maintained such a view. 
B. 
nomenalist considers the above puzzles some of the main reasons. 
for their respect ive answer s .  That i s ,  they think that these 
puzzles are puzzles , and their answers are int ended to solve them. 
On the other hand , the realist does not consider them puzzles , 
but , more or les s ,  pressed by the obscurity of the other s '  solu­
tions , he has felt himself compelled to give an explicit answer 
that dissolves the puzzles . 
This difference has another side , too . It i s  mainly these 
puzzles we have to refer to in order to explain why philo sophers 
have felt compelled to correct the fun4amental presuppo sitions 
concerning perception , which we all ordinarily make under stood 
through our ways of speaking and thinking about percept ion . 
Presuppo sit ions such as that in some cases what we perceive are 
things in spac e and t ime , the event s they form part of , sounds 
they make , &:c . ; and that through our senses we acquire knowledge 
of the nature of these things . Accordingly, this differenc-e i s  
often contrasted by saying that while the idealist and phenomena­
list views are philosophical , the r ealist i s  associated with the 
common-sense view which requires analysi s ,  just ificat ion , and cor­
rection . 
d. PhenomenaZisms. The problem of perception has often been 
put in a slightly different form which reflect s more closely the 
reasonings that give rise to it . For example Quinton offers this 
formulation : 
The problem of perc eption is  to give an account 
of the relationship of sense-experienc e to mat ­
erial obj ect s .  
It seems obvious to me , however , that too much i s  already assumed 
in that case . First of all , of course , that such an account i s  
needed , which means that the reasonings I sketched above as giving 
rise to the quest ion implicitly are acc epted as problemat ic . But , 
in the next place , also the terms of ' sense-experienc e' and 'mat-
erial obj ect ' are accept ed as the items defining the problem; as 
I shall argue lat er these assumpt ions are of no small importance 
and t hat there i s  no good reason to make them at all . At the 
same time I find that put in thi s  way the phenomenali st ic answer 
seems more easily accessible .  
Philosophers o f  this  type , that i s ,  those who maintain that 
we perceive sense-obj ect s ( only) , obviously must take upon them-
selves the task of giving sat isfactory account of what we call 
perc eption of things . And just as obvious , this account can only 
be of one kind : since all we perceive is  of one kind - sense-ob-
j ect s or sense-data - regardless of whether our perc ept ion i s  
veridical or non-veridical , then the difference between perceiving 
a thing , and , say , an illusion must be that in the former case 
there exist s a thing which has one or other relation to the sense-
datum we perceive directly. 
When we say that a person perc eives a thing , we ordinarily 
10 . 
presuppose that he knows that he perceives it 1 Therefore we 
must claim that the relation which i s  said to hold between sense-
datum and thing is a relation of which we have good reason to 
assume that the person can know or believe holds between them when 
he perceives a thing . Here , preci sely , one of two pos sible phe-
nomenalist ic account s or theories about the nature of that relation , 
viz .  the representative theory of  p�cept ion , contains a logical 
howler .  According to this theory the relation i s  most often int -
erpreted as a causal relat ion - less often as a relation which i s  
stated as "appearing" between thing and datum. 
But , as it has been known since Berkeley and Hume , it hardly 
makes sense to say that the person can know, still less have rea-
son to believe , that any such relation holds , for any t est imony 
of his senses are , ex hypothesi , limited to ·data.  Thi s obj ection 
appear s dec isive , and I need only to point out one paradoxical 
implication before moving on . It is implied that if perc eiving a 
thing is  direct perc ept ion of a datum which is  an effect or ap-
pearance of the thing , then the possibility is  allowed for that 
the thing may change it ' s  nature radically , without any conse-
quences for our percept ion of it , granted it continuously produc es 
the same effect s or appearances as  before .  
1 .  I should like t o  emphasize ' ordinarily ' here , since certain 
cases , such as unconscious perception , failure to realize what 
i s  perc eived , and the like , seem to indicate on the contrary 
that such knowledge is not required . It seems to me , however , 
that thi s is  a group of borderlinecases , that means merely 
that perc ept ion does not necessarily involve full attent ion . 
ll. 
In an attempt to evade the difficulties of the representative 
theory some phenomenalist s  state a different nature of the relation , 
which I shall speak of as the sense-datum theory of perception . The 
sense datist holds the view that things or , closer to his own t er­
minology , mat erial obj ect s are a collection of data actual as well 
as po ssible .  To perceive a material obj ect-is to  perceive a datum 
which i s  a sign of the pos sible attainment of other data that have 
a c ertain relat ion to the former . That a data  i s  a sign thereof -
that I ,  under certain conditions will perc eive such and such other 
data,  i s  something my previous.experienc e provides the reason to 
believe . The sense-datum theory clearly gains it ' s  plausibility 
from it ' s  ability to dispose of the difficult ies of the representa­
tive theory. Unfortunately it ' s . own difficult ies cannot be dis­
posed of , which is  my task to show in the present paper . So to 
avoid unnec essary repit it ion I shall not list them here , but con­
tinue to prepare the stage for the battle .  
"Defense of Corrunon Sense"· 
In order to foreclose some of the current philosophical ob-
j ections , it remains for me to answer the question of what criteria 
can be the base of a successful rebuttal of phenomenalistic thea-
ries . As indicated in several places already , departure from our 
common sense views is  suffic ient to dismiss  further theorizing . 
Indeed , the philosophical views I am examining arise only in con-
trast with our common sense views . This position has oft en peen 
referred to , a bit condesc endingly , as naive realism;  also as j ust 
common-sense or the plain men ' ·s view 1 . For philosophical purpo ses 
it is  unfortunat e that reali sm has not· been dealt with systematic -
ally. The absenc e of such a work is , however , a fact that rest s on 
good grounds ; in spite of the fragmentary foundation I ,  for present 
purpose dare offer , it will be seen , though of indispensable ex-
ternal , to be of questionable int ernal significanc e .  The main 
just ification and incitement to give the following "defense of 
common sense" in the indicated sense is  thus that a good many 
philo sophers have failed to realize certain of their own presup-
positions and so failed to realize the nature of the realist ' s  
argument s against them. 
1.  This was even reflected in one of the first referenc es to rea­
lism ,  c f .  D . Hume ' s  First Inquiry , Sec . XII , Part I .  
13 . 
Having taken these precaut ions I shall offer a "defense of 
nl:live realism" in four steps .  The question often makes itself 
felt via reasonings of the following kind : When confronted with 
philosophic account s such as the sense data theory of perception , 
the naive realist ' s  obj ections take the form of drawing attent ion 
to ( or somet imes stating ) our ordinar� ways of speaking ; for in­
stance , in aasu , by saying that ordinary usage does not legit imize  
an inferenc e from the fact that a thing appears such and suc h ,  to 
the fact that there is something , which is such and such.  His 
opponent may agree that we actually speak in thi s  way , but claim 
that thi s certainly is  not dec isive and that , on the contrary , 
t hese part s of common sense knowledge themselves are something that 
need j ust ificat ion sinc e his argument s prove them to be in error . 
Put more generally his point is  that if one want s to defend common 
sense against philosophical theses , which are incompat ible with 
it , it will simply not do to repeat common sense ' s  views . 
We may first not e here that the opponent has misconc eived 
naive realism .  It is , viz. , not , as implied in his way of argument , 
a theory or a thesis . It is  the patent frame for all of our think­
ing , act ing , and speaking , ( and not e thus also the sine qua non for 
-his obj ect ions ) .  If we then say , for example ,  that because a coin 
looks ellipt ical from a c ertain angle it does not follow that 
there i s  something , a sense-datum , which i s  ellipt ical , thi s  is  
true simply because there is  no good reason or argument for doubt-
14. 
ing thi s  fact . It obviously follows that -the burden of  proof is  
on the opponent of naive realism.  Or; to take another example ,  
the statement that a thing and- it ' s  properties exist independently 
of  whether it is  perc eived or not . This stat ement evidently i s  
beyond any doubt if there is  no argument s against it . Suppo se I 
put my pipe into it ' s  case ; before I did so , I perc eived it , now 
nobody perceives it , and if I then open the case I perceive the 
pipe again . While t�e case was clo sed , and consequently nobody 
perc eived the pipe , it was st ill a pipe and was , of cour se ,  also 
yellow. This is what we mean by saying that things and their 
propert ies exist independently df whether they are perceived or 
not . Thi s i s ,  of course ,  a trivial fact about the pipe . To deny 
that this is  the case i s  thus absurd - ordinary language is all 
right as it i s .  
That realism forms the conc eptual frame inside o f  which  we 
make stat ement s and inferenc es concerning the world has the im­
plication , which is fatal for argument s against it , that such 
counterargument s followingly becomes argument s against their own 
presuppo sitions . And as I said above that realism is true unless 
there are good reasons or argument s for doubting it , it therefore 
also follows that they are impossible .  That is , i f  the opponent 
continues to believe that his argument s actually disprove the rea­
list ic view, he slips into what we may call a revisionist po sit ion ; 
thi s ,  of course , I will have to take into account . What the rev-
isionist , as I understand him , is  suggesting i s  that we know what 
ordinary' language says , but as hi s ,analysis shows it is  vit iated 
because of ambiguit ies and inconsist encies . The philosophical 
problems that gave rise to his theory is  sufficient proof that 
ordinary language i s  not all right as it i s .  
15. 
Put· otherwis e ,  the revisionist ' s  claim amount s to the pro­
position that even though realism is the conceptual frame presup­
posed in our thinking , it might be wrong or inappropriat e ;  the­
refore we could choo se another. and better frame . Thi s i s  true if 
reali sm was only one of several pos sible frameworks , one that we 
more or less inc identally had acquired . But is  this the case? If 
not , then we are not free to replace it , that i s , realism is not 
only our factual but our necessary conc eptual frame . 
MOore confronted ,  in the now classical answer to thi s  
question , general metaphysical and sc eptical theses with concret e 
cases of common sense knowledge . His point was that there must 
be something fundamentally wrong in a philosophical view, which 
implies that our knowledge about trivial things such as that this  
i s  one hand and that that i s  a table , is  derivat ive knowledge , 
knowledge that i s  based upon something we know or perc eive in a 
more fundamental sense than thi s .  
Another answer , also assoc iated with Moore , i s  the view of 
language that among other things is assoc iat ed with the famous 
paradigm-case argument . It is  ·true of both phenomenali stic theo­
ries of perception , as touched upon , that they imply a definite 
consequence as to ordinary perc eptual stat ement .s , for example ,  "I 
see t he lighthouse" - a consequence , which the most rash of  their 
devotees expressed by saying , that statement s of that type simply 
are incorrect ways of speaking , since what I really see is  a 
sense-datum , while the existence of the lighthouse and it s proper­
ties is something to which I infer . Some more cautious , have 
confined themselves to say that thi s type of statement actually 
expresses truth, but not if they are used to stat e  the kind of 
judgment , as they are used for and as , it i s  maintained , reflect s 
the unwarrant ed j udgment s of  common sense.  The most caut ious , e . g .  
Mbore himself , have preferred to say that the grammatical form 
of t hese statement s t ends to mislead us when we wish to know what 
precisely i s  true , when perc eptual stat ement s of this kind are 
true ; since what i s  the case is  far more complicat ed than grammat­
ical form reveals - a relat ionship , which involves a referenc e to 
a sense-datum of which the linguistic expression has no mark at 
all . 
This view of language could be put in the following way : 
our ordinary ways of speaking c annot misrepresent the situations 
in which they commonly are used, simply because their meaning i s  
determined and learned by o stensive definition in such situations . 
And sinc e an expression cannot refer to anything else than what 
17. 
we use it to mean there i s  no quest ion of misrepresent ing or mi s-
interpret ing the situations to which it refers - granted only-that 
it really equates  the one of  which we learned to use the expression 
and for the purpo se it was introduc ed . 
However thi s  view, which seems to be in Malcolm 1 s essay 
"Moore and Ordinary Language" 1 and is  found also in Mart in Lean ' s  
crit ical analysi s of Broad ' s  theory of perception 
2 
' operates 
on the assumpt ion that different types of situat ions exist all 
ready, so to speak, needing only to be correlated with an expres-
sion each via an ost ensive definit ion . It does not provide a real 
answer - an answer which i s  more than a mere rej ect ion of philo so-
pher s who hold that the choice of the s ituations by means of which 
we ostensively define expressions , may depend on theoret ical 
presuppo sit ions , and that by introducing an expression in a cer-
tain way we may ( somet imes ) bind ourselves to more than the use we 
intent ionally give to it . But one thing it can do i s  to show how 
an attack on the paradigm-case argument goes wrong . Passmore ) 
attacks Malcolm' s  use of a dist inction between the classes of ex-
.pressions learned through descript ions and through ost ensive 
definit ion s ,  by saying , quit e convinc ingly it seems to me , that 
there i s  no sharp distinct ion there 3 But from this fact , .  if it 
1. The Philosophy of c:E. Moore ,  ed. P .A . Schilpp , New York , 1952. 
2 .  �ense-peraeption and Matter, London , 1953. 
3 . Philosophical Reasoning , New York , 1961. 
i s  a �act , it simply does not �allow that either o� these classes 
is erased ; moreover the absenc e o� a strict distinct ion does not 
exclude that some expressions are learned ost ensively, nor that 
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we can agree on such cases . Which case i s  more obvious  than Moo­
re ' s  own "Here is one hand" ; I do not know that Moore should have 
used the paradigm-case argument for the expression ' material thing ' ,  
but he did mean to imply that if a mat erial thing i s  " something 
to be met with in spac e" the above u,se of the argument , per impli­
cat ion , made a propo sit ion such a·s "We do not perceive mat erial 
things" of quest ionable use . Passmore ' s  conclusion , which is  
that philo sophers '  argument s cannot either be suffic ient reason 
for banishing or retaining expressions , i s  then insuffic ient for 
dismissing the paradigm-case argument - if that i s  a philosophers '  
argument at all . His strategy thus fails to force the philoso­
phers '  paradoxes upon the plain man by sending him through sense­
dat i st s '  stories . For such an adopt ion really presuppo ses that 
the s ituations really are there and , moreover , that the plain man 
stays that way after the adoption of the dati st ' s  paradoxes . 
Ordinary language is not arbitrary in this sense ; and referenc e ,  
e . g .  by using the paradigm-case argument , to incoherence with com­
mon usage is  not , therefore , without forc e .  
/ 
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Identification. 
I do not think that we have to be so easily satisfied . Hart­
nack has charact erized realism ·as the assumpt ions that stands if 
the argument s against it fail 1• One such assumpt ion I said was 
that the things ( and their propert ies ) exist independently of 
whether they are perceived or not . Or , as he put s it , many argu­
ment s seem to show that there i s  no numerical ident ity between 
things and the visual pictures one i s  present ed with when one 
sees , and therefore conclude s that numerical identity i s  essen­
tial to naive realism. 
The use of language requires that both the SJ?eaker and the 
rec eiver understand what i s  said . The receiver must understand 
what it is  the speaker i s  talking about , that is , unless the po s­
sibility of such an agreement exist s ,  there could be no language .  
It i s  thus essent ial that a rec eiver is  able t o  identify that 
which  is  talked about . In line with what I have already said , an 
ident ification i s  successfully done when it cannot be doubted . 
Let us take a look at a case : how do I know that the cup I am 
talking about i s  identical with the cup you are talking about 
or take me to be talking about? Of course , first of all , I must 
be able to ident ify the cup more prec isely either by point ing at 
it or give it s relat ion in t ime and spac e to some or other thing 
1. On seeing , Danish Yearbook of Philosophy , 1964 . 
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the identity of  which we agree upon , i . e .  i s  beyond any reasonable 
doubt . Two quest ions that have to be answered in order to ident ify 
a thing successfully are thus when and where . Next of course you 
go through the same proc edure and if your result corresponds with 
mine , we both know which cup i s  the subj ect of conversation . 
We can even say more than that . Suppo se I ,  for some purpose ,  
wanted to know that the coffee cup on my desk i s  the same cup as  
I left there thi s  afternoon . First I will take a good look at it 
from all angles ,  knock at it , test it chemically , perhaps ,  &c • •  
Further I shall ask my wife whether she has replaced it or noticed 
whether anybody else did , &c • •  And when I have checked not only 
as above , it s locat ion in t ime and spac e ,  but in all the relevant 
respect s ,  established what we could call the cup's causal continuity , 
Iam at last convinced it is  the same cup . The point i s  that I am in 
my good right to be so , for what i s  it I have performed?' I have 
ruled out that the cup is  an illusion , a cardboard , a subst·itute , 
noted charact eri stic s such as color , shape , a scratch in a c ertain 
plac e ,  &c . ,  in short I have no further reason to doubt the cup's 
identity .  Further doubt would be merely trivial in the sense 
that I would not have accepted any cup and people could rightly 
claim that I had grown scept ical . Not e that this set of condit ions 
i s  ent irely cont ingent , since any of this cup's characterist ic s 
might have been otherwi se , and there need not be any other cup 
precisely the same in all respect s - that would indeed be very un-
likely. These logical features of . the concept of ' identity ' cor-
1 
responds to what has been described as a cluster-concept , that 
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is , the application of ' ident ical ' is controlled by a whole cluster 
of criteria all of which can be regarded as synthet ic . 
Two features deserve a comment here . Fir st , the question of 
the causal cont inuity does not present a problem of whether we 
are able to observe the cup cont inuously , but· is  a question as to 
whether the relevant respect s in which it could have been inter-
rupted i s  checked out ; and if I ,  e . g . , did not trust my wife ' s  
statement , it could be tested as any other statement about the 
past , which i s  a general epi stemological issue not here at stake. 
Secondly, it should be emphasized that in some cases the whole 
cluster may be mi ssing , thus it s cont ingency ,  without j eopadizing 
the concept of identity. For example does it make sense to ask 
me whether it i s  the same cup , if I had not left my desk during 
the afternoon? What serious answer i s  pos sible to my response : 
"Well , what do you mean ! The same in what respect ?"  Another 
example could be my own identity as it makes no sense either to 
say that my ident ity changed without my noticing it . What may 
change my personality or body, say certain experiences , at the 
same t ime constitutes the very causal continuity that guarantees 
my ident ity.  
1 .  H . Putnam : Brains and Behavior , in AnaZytiaaZ Philosophy , Second 
series ,  ed . Butler , Oxford , 1965. 
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I have gone into some detail conc erning the conc ept of 
identity to show (1} what we mean by saying that a thing is nume-
rically identical with a thing that I have seen before or another 
person has seen before or i s  talking about , since ident ification 
was a necessary presupposit ion for language . It is thus seen that 
also that part of ordinary language which concerns the space-t ime 
system and the existence of things which can be identified are 
necessary conditions for having a language . (2) That it i s  not 
a vacuous claim that realism is  the conc eptual frame for thinking , 
talking , and act ing . There might be obj ect ions to this analysis 
of ' identity' - I cannot see any. But even if there were , the 
important point is that without this conceptual frame , without 
the possibility of identificat ion we could not pos sibly under stand 
each other - we would be , so to speak , no longer language using 
beings , in which case , of course , the difficult ies referres to could 
not arise . This i s  the fourth and last st ep that might also be put : 
ordinary language is not only all right as it i s ,  it has to be as  
it  i s .  ( 3 )  Because ,  as  we shall see , this has obviously special 
significance in connect ion with the sense-datist ' s  doctrine s .  
To sum up , I started out granting Austin his point that mere 
reference to or analysis of ordinary language is  not the last 
werd in a philosophical debate .  Addit ionally it has to be shown , 
viz . , what kind of force such referenc e or analysis of common usage 
has . And further that since our common-sense "assumptions" - naive 
realism ,  philosophically speaking - ar� necessary conditions for 
having a language ,  ordinary language not only i s  all right , but 
has to be as it i s .  
Thus I have "left everything as  it i s" - the task i s  t o  get 
clear about what i s  in ordinary language . One way of finding out 
i s  to show what is  wrong in philosophical doctrine s that contra­
dict or deny common sense .  That i s , the puzzles , which motivated 
philosophers to try to correct our common views , should not after 
all be in ordinary language .  Paradoxically enough , a s  we have 
seen , it is sufficient to repeat , perhaps more carefully and 
clearly , the common sense views . Or rather it ought to be suf­
ficient , because , unfortunately, it is  a fact that a good many 
philosopher s even when confronted with the paradoxes or absurdi­
ties following from their conclusions ,  still are inclined to 
move away from common sense regarding the phenomena that tempt ed 
them in the fir st plac e .  To remove the temptation is  also needed 
to provide a better under standing of these phenomena , and prefer­
ably at least of all the phenomena which they maintain can be 
adequately understood only within their theory. That i s ,  in my 
discussion the sense-data theory of  perc eption . Only so i s  the 
defense of common sense completed . 
Given the succ ess of my argument s so far , my po sition is  
that these are no problems in the philosophy of perc eption . Pe-
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culiar as it may sound , I know in advance  that whatever the sense-
datist may say ,  there is something wrong in it - we do not need 
his solut ion . In a metaphor which was given to me , I am in a si-
milar po sition to the patient who can t ell hi s doctor : "I rej ect 
your cure , because I have no disease" . When our ordinary perc ep-
tual and epi stemic ways of speaking are challenged by the diag-· 
nosis of either fallacious logic or disregard of fact s ,  certain 
cures are prescribed . I have given an answer to the delicate 
question : Why it i s  suffic ient to repeat our. common sense views 
when they are obj ected to - it is not the naive realist , but hi s 
opponent s that need a cure in order to see the nature of hi s 
claims and of the realist ' s  argument s .  The cure I now shall of-
fer is to lay out the problems that the dat i st finds himself con-
fronted with;  examine his attempts to solve these problems ; and 
then indicate why he fail s .  
"The problem of error". 
Let me start with the mo st conspic ious class of phenomena of-
fered as providing unavoidable argument s against common-sense .  It 
has ,  I think, happened to us all , let it be "unsaid" how often , 
that one of our perceptual statement s has turned· out to be false . 
I have stated something to be the case , which  I succeedingly real-
ize it was not , or somebody el se point s out to me that it i s  or 
was not the case . Whatever the way , I admit that I was wrong . 
Suppose I ,  in the rush hour among the crowd , on the oppo sit·e 
sidewalk, see one of my friends , say , Jack. When I arrive home , 
I at the dinner table tell my wife that I saw Jack , although I 
believe he did not see me , due , perhaps , to the number of people 
in the street at that time . She i s  surprised and ask me whether 
I am sur e ,  to  which I answer that of course I ·am sure , I saw him. 
She is  not satisfied and t ells me that according to her knowledge 
Jack has been out of town for the last three days and is suppo sed 
to be away this week also , which may , considering her general re-
liability , make me admit that I was wrong . However , I may be so 
sure that I saw Jack that I insist on having seen him , wherefore 
to settle the matter we call Jack and ask him where he was at the 
time I claim to have seen him , take witnesses , I take an opt ical 
test , &c . ,  &c . ,  and at last I must admit that after all I was 
wrong . Given the described circumstanc es I could not possibly 
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have seen Jack at that time at that plac e .  
However ,  I obviously saw someone or something which I took , 
but took mistakenly, to be Jack . What was it I saw? Here the 
dati st proposes that the only way this phenomenon can be accounted 
for adequately i s  by saying that what I saw was a sense-datum. 
Only by introducing sense-data are we able to account for the fact 
that even when my perc eptual judgment is false I saw something 
1 
anyway . But if this is  so , he continues , then it must be the 
case that whether my statement i s  true or false I s ee a sense-
datum , since whichever one of my perc eptual statements I pick, my 
reason for rejecting it is that I take some other statement ( s )  to 
be more trustworthy, in aasu: what my wife , Jack , the optician , 
the witnesses , &c . ,  &c . ,  says . It is a fact that we rej ect some 
of our statements because we accept others ; but from thi s it does 
not follow that those we acc ept are true . Further , the dati st 
claims , this i s  a challenge to the realist : how will he explain 
what I saw ,  which has been put in the slogan that the· naive realist 
is unable to cope with the problem of error . But is  this not , 
prima facie , still better than being unable to cope with veridical 
perception? 
Several things that are wrong are involved here . I shall 
1 .  See , e . g . , A . J . Ayer : The ProbZem of KnowZedge , p . 38 .  
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deal with two of them here and leave t·he rest to the subsequent 
sections .  
a. What I regard as the central issue that goes wrong in 
1 
this reasoning i s  in Aust in ' s  words ( slightly adopted ) that talk 
of falsity only makes sense against a background of general non-
fals ity. We cannot be fooled all the time . It must be pos siole 
to recognize what is fal se by checking the odd case against more 
normal one s .  Thus , a s  a fir st suggest ion , we may ask on what ba-
sis do we acc ept some stat ement s rather than others? We might get 
as an answer that some are trustworthy while other s are not , since 
no statement s would be spec ially open to distrust unless some 
were trustworthy.  But st ill it does  not follow that we are not 
mistaken in trusting those that we do trust . Then we may ask why 
we find some statement s trustworthy while not others? We might 
get the answer that some are reliable while others are unreliable , 
since no statement s would be especially • • •  , and so forth .  Quite 
a few steps might be taken in such a spiral ; but sooner or later 
it will reach the point where what i s  questioned again i s  the 
semantical rule of truth-telling 2 , the denial of which simply is  
1 .  Sense and Sensibilia , p . ll .  Similarly : G . Ryle : Percept ion , in 
Dilemmas , Cambridge , 1966 , p . 94f .  
2.  This rule shall , of course ,  not be confounded with the moral 
rule of truth-telling , which could be formulated thus : it is 
(morally) wrong to tell a lie . One differen�e logically spea-
. king,  i s  that lying implies knowing the truth,  while saying 
something false does not . Another i s  that falsity is not con­
ditioned by the speakers intent ion s .  Cf . further , e . g . , F .  
Waismann : The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy , New York , 
1968 , p . 294. 
absurd . Thi s  rule is  simply that unless something true is said,  
which in turn brings us  back to the po ssibility of identification 
( cf .  previous section ) ,  we cannot understand what is said . Viol­
ation of thi s rule i s  simply failure to say anything . A .language 
that could not·be corrected is no language at all . ·  This is why 
the background of non-falsity i s  general . 
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We can now spot the fallacy in the dati st ' s  moves. At each 
step in the spiral his claim has been that the argument either way 
is not dec isive , sinc e all 'the statements we pick might be fals e .  
But what i s  the consequence? That all perceptual statements we 
pick are • •  ? • •  where he each time decides in favor of'falsity , 
thus adhering to the di stinction he just denied we can apply . 
But how can he give us any reason for believing his doubt i s  rel­
evant ? An ideal appears vaguely (which I shall deal with later ) 
that we shall prove our claim that some particular statement i s  
true . But how , then , can he even formulate hi s obj ection? 
Here preci sely the datist begs the question . He set off by 
the claim that we know that we sometimes make false perceptual 
statements .  Let us grant him that it i s  sense-data we are seeing 
when non-veridical perception occurs . Then he says that there i s  
a difference between what we see and what i s  there to be seen . 
Thi s in turn implies that we , at least , sometimes see what there 
is and that we know that . If he gives up this claim he i s  back 
in , and liable to the errors of ,  the representative theory.which 
it was hi s declared aim to restore . Otherwise even the notion of 
' false ' perceptual statement :looses application - aontra his own 
hypothesis . He has to keep the rule of truth-telling in or4er to 
make himself understood , and to get his obj ection off the ground 
he has to establish one false statement , which leads to the other 
point . The datist actually did check against the non-false  case , 
hi s general obj ection i s  an obj ection against his own presupposi­
tions . 
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How did we establish that my perceptual statement , that I saw 
Jack , is false? Among other things , by asking people who were on 
the opposite sidewalk as witnesses . Leaving halluc inations , &c . ,  
for later , what these witnesses establi sh is  that the person I saw 
was not Jack but someone els e ,  or else the datist looses even his 
false statement . What i s  most important here is to note that it 
is  simply a non-sequitur to argue : that because I was wrong , it 
must have been a sense-datum that I saw .  It was not Jack or a 
sense-datum I saw it was some other per son . When the·datist thus 
substitutes sense-data for a person in order to account for per­
c eptual errors he involves himself in paradoxes , such as estab­
lishing the falsity of statements about unidentifiables , reali zing 
perc eptual mistakes without checking� and the like . Both bottles 
and flies are created .  
b. The datist might , however , say here that it i s  not becau­
se we can establish the facts it i s  true that Jack was absent and 
that some other person was what I saw ,  that I was wrong . But be-
cause we can imagine what it would be like if I was right ; conse-
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quently it does not follow that we actually have a false perc eptu-
al stat ement , and hi s point that of  cour se there are true state-
ment s we just do not know which they are , is saved and the intro-
duction of sense-data legit imized . This is beside the point , in-
deed , since it appears to me that to argue this way he slips into 
a hypothetically edit ion , so to speak , of the whole issue . And 
saying something hypothet ically , i . e .  I might have been wrong , if 
I conceivably might have been right , which would be like so and so , 
&c . ,  is j ust a - perhaps a polite - way of  saying that it did not 
happen altogether . Thus I was not wrong , I did not see Jack , nor 
someone else , I did not perceive anything , I was not there - and 
what do I know. The quest ion is not at present what we might 
perc eive , but what is  it we do perceive? 
What has been said in this  sect ion obviously involved the ar� 
gument of the polar concept s ,  which also has been attacked by Pass-
1 
more His conclusion that 
there is  no general argument from a predicate ' s  
having no oppo site to it s being ' senseless ' , or 
even useless 
is certainly agreeable .  Thus I should , perhaps , shortly make it 
clear why the above use is one that works . There are predicates 
the use of which are only intelligible if there is something to 
which the predicat e  does not apply , and , fortunately enough , 
1 .  op. cit. , pp . l00-113 . 
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Passmore provide s a few examples both of predicates of which this 
i s  true and of which it is false , such as ' copy 1 ,  1 counterfeit ' , · 
' imitation ' ,  and ' simple ' ,  ' describable ' ,  ' natural ' ,  respect ively . 
An attempt to outline a plausible general criterion goes far be-
yond the present discussion and , maybe , my capability. My conten-
t ion has been that ' false ' belongs to the former of these kinds in 
that it is a nec essary cat egory , that is , one without which lan-
guage is impossible , - not the one , that is , as a general logical 
princ iple about the nature of predicat es .  
One of Passmore ' s  reasons for denying the validity of the 
application of thi s  argument in general is that for certain purpo­
ses it is quit e legit imate to operate with universal predicat es 1 
For instanc e ,  in the cont ext of a given philosophical controver sy , 
he claims , is makes perfectly good sense to say that "All state-
ment s are vague" .  So , for that special purpose one may disregard 
common usage . MOreover , given such c ircumstanc es , it is no obj ec -
t ion to employ or appeal to the ( supposedly ) common sense principle 
of excluded opposites . Let it be granted that this is  one of the 
relevant criteria - I am not sure what a purpose of pure philo so-
phic controver sy serves . But even such an excuse is  not available 
to the datist , sinc e ( i ) hi s philosophical stat ement s have the 
purpo se of correct ion of common sense (we shall later see him with-
draw into the sphere of pure philo sophic controversy ) , and ( ii ) 
1 .  However Urmson has a point indeed: " . .  there is  always some univ­
ersal , some principle of classification , to be found under which 
they both fall . This is absurd ."  in Recognition , P. A .  S. , vol. LVI . 
such purpose cannot , if any at all , justify neglecting the con­
ditions for saying something altogether . 
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We may conclude that the phenomena of perc eptual error provi­
des no reason for introducing sense-data into the analysis of  per­
c eption . In fact , precision of that sort only provides embottled 
flies . 
IL Zusions, &a • •  
However , perc eptual error i s  not the only class of phenomena 
that the datist claims is a chief obstacle to the reali st . The 
second class  where there is  no. perfect coincidenc e between appear­
ance and reality, the latter even in the sens e so far dealt with , 
is  illusion . Obviously that description of the cases in question 
needs a definite context , sinc e:, prima facie , it is not at all clear 
that any appearances are not part of reality , and , once more,  we 
meet the assumption that the realist position i s  more or less iden­
tified with the materialist's above , in that the datist points out 
that we are not always perc eiving 'material objects ' .  
MY justification for treating these phenomena separately 
and not as a subclass of  perceptual error is , as we shall see in 
more detail , that they compri se categories of their own , c atego­
ries that are easily distingui shable and to a great extent recog-
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nized and reflect ed in common usage . Only under the assumpt ion 
of the mat erial i stic po sition as the dat ist invites us to oppo se , 
i s  it true that perc eptual error includes illusions , mirages ,  af-
ter-images ,  &c • •  Although a very · heterogeneous clas s , none of the 
latter phenomena are , as the former , to be classified as misidenti-
fications or misdescriptions .  In fact such a claim only makes 
sense in the cont ext of the materialist ic assumption . Describing 
or referring to something as a mirage , e . g � , is not an erroneous 
classification of that something as .a material obj ect , but a pro-
per classification without which our language would be incomple-
te  for talking about the factual world .  
I should , perhaps , say preliminarily (1 ) that I do not pre-
t end to offer an exhaust i-e "geography" of the perc eptual conc ept s  
pertaining t o  these phenomena , but (only) as much a s  suffices 
to show the adequat eness of the realist , compared to the datist 
position . ( 2 )  That , with exc ept ion of percept ion in dreams , it 
seems obviously an exaggerat ion when philosophers have referred 
to these phenomena as a massive part of our perc eptual experiences 
The phenomena usually c it ed in connection with the so-called 
argument from illusion could be exemplified as follows . (1 ) Sup-
pose I am in a plane flying above a railroad track;  at any given 
t ime I will see the tvro tracks as running together at a point at 
some distance ,  while ,  when the plane reaches that point , I see 
1. In the philosophic cont ext this observat ion was made by Austin , 
cf .  op . ait . , p . l2f . 
1 
that they still run parallel to_ each other . ( 2 )  If I pres s  my 
eye with a finger , while looking at a candle , I can see two 
candles ;  when the pressure is  relieved I see that there is  only 
one candle .  ( 3 )  While I look at the c inerama I will see , e .  g . , 
a thousand slaves build a huge pyramid of awful heavy stones ; 
but when the light i s  turned on again , I realize that there are 
neither a thousand people nor any stones on the screen . (.4 )  Mr .  
Elwood P . Dowd ' s  sist er from t ime to t ime saw the pooker ' Harvey ' ,  
while the rest of the town ' s  inhabitant s did not see any 9 foot 
tall rabbit . Besides these cases there are .a series of other s ,  
such a s  after images , mirages ,  dreams , &c . ,  &c • •  
Now the datist says that what were seen in these cases , i . e .  
converging tracks , the double candle ,  pyramids and slavemasses , 
and Harvey, are obviously not mat erial obj ect s .  Yet it i s  just 
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as obvious that some things were seen ; and these somethings he 
calls ' seeming obj ect s ' or sense-dat a ,  as they are very like real 
obj ect s when perceived. In so far that the perc ept ion of material 
obj ect s and of seeming obj ect s are alike , the dati st claims , their 
analysis  shall follow the same patt ern ; and are we bound to say 
that we see seeming obj ect s - sense-qata - in some cases , thi s  
holds in all . 
1 .  Ryle has argued against the sense-data  theori st , that to 
see i s  always to have seen 1, from which it follows that seeing 
1 .  op. oit. , p. lo2 ff . 
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does not and cannot refer to the experienc e of a seeming obj ect ,  
in fact that no such experience exists ;  thus there i s  no need for 
' sense-data ' either in veridical or in non-ve�idical perc eption.  
However the datist insists that there are such experienc es . 
And he is right , I actually saw the converging tracks , the double 
candl e ,  &c . ,  and these are ,  moreover , repeatable phenomena . Thi s 
obj ection fails because it makes perfectly good sense for a per-
son in , say ,  an optical test to answer : Yes l , to the question : 
Do you see now? , which , of course ,  is  not to be taken as a question 
of whether the test-person has the ability of seeing - blind people 
do not attend optical tests . So the per son i s  using the present 
tense of the perc eptual verb to see without any implied trans-
formation of it to the past t ense . 
Furthermore ,  such a transformation ( taken as a logical impli-
cation ) would involve a contradiction : if  I at time
1 
Sf?.Y "I see 
the rainbow" and this means strictly speaking "I have seen the 
rainbow" , then "I see the rainbow ( now ) 11 must be true at t , which 
0 
ex hypothesi implies that I have already seen the rainbow at t
_1 , 
and so forth ; i . e .  that for any t before t it i s  both true and 0 
false that I have seen the rainbow . 
' 
2. An obj ection more to the point is , however , obviously that 
when I see , let us say, a hor se in my dream , I am seeing a horse 
and not "a seeming horse" or something that "looks as a horse" ; 
or , for instanc e ,  in the traditional half immersed stick case , I 
am not j ust "thinking or seeming to see" a bent stick - I see it . 
In fact , that I do see these things· in these cases i s  j ust the 
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sine qua non for the existenc e of phenomena of' deception , illusion , 
hallucination , &c • •  
3 .  Thi s does not mean , of course,  that all such cases ar e  
alike . When the datist is tempted to point out in these cases 
that what I saw were not material obj ects in which he is right , 
indeed - it is suggested that the realist thought so , which , were 
it true , could be a reason for using the predicate ' naive ' about 
him . Consequently , it is claimed that the realist is in error , 
because in these perc eptual situations no material obj ects are 
perc eived at all . But as Austin points out 1 , actually even when 
we are haying an illusion, hallucination , &c . ,  it does not follow 
that we are also deluded . I know perfectly well that the tracks 
do not converge , that there is  only one candle , that no slaves 
or stones are in the theater , and so forth . Admittedly , I would 
be a bit naive if I actually tried to meet these things , I would 
suffer from ' gro ssly di sordered belief's ' ;  or rather my conceptual 
frame would be incomplete .  
Actually , quite exceptional c ircumstanc es are required even 
in cases of illusions , &c . ,  to be deluded ; I know, viz . , perfectly 
well that I went into the theater , &c . ;  a drunkard need not be 
totally ignorant about his D . T . ' s ,  neither could anybody ignore 
l .  Sense and SensibiZia , p . 22 ff . 
that the stick is immersed ,  even Elwood P . Dowd himself knew that 
some people failed to notice Harvey . But admittedly , delusions 
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do occur , just as an illusionist , if his trick is  well done , can 
make us see a hankerchief change color continuously and thus 
puzzle us as to which color it really has - if you try hard enough , 
it is po ssible to deceive even the best observer . 
It should be noted also that delusions form a category of 
their own , which need not involve any perception at all . .  If I< 
have a delusion of grandeur , say, and think firmly that I am Na­
poleon the Emperor , it does not seem plausible that thi s involved 
that I perc eive the world otherwise than most other people �o . 
Delusion thus involves more than merely b�ing deceived by one ' s  
senses as to the ex�stenc e of material obj ects . 
4.  But , the dati st wants to say ,  rare or not , delus ions do 
occur and that fact proves his point . That is , as I said above , 
we actually do see things in illus ions , dreams , &c , and we are 
deluded becaus e the hankerchief changes color , my dream hor se 
actually ran wild,  &c . ,  I c annot tell the difference between the 
experiences I have of reality and of illusions , &c • •  They are 
qua titative Zy identical . During my hallucination moreover , I may 
not be able to tell whether it is  a hallucination or a "live" 
event , it i s  pos sible that I am so deluded that I believe that 
these events do happen . Thi s i s  what we mean by "a real halluci­
nation" . To the datist this provides yet another motive for adop-
t ing the sense-data analysi s ,  sinc e when I can see the things and 
event s which are not there and firmly believe they are ,  then what 
I see in the two cases must be ident ical . 
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This phenomenon may provide a mot ive for the datist , but ac­
tually the situat ion is no different than that as when I am here , 
I cannot tell what i s  going on in the next room. From the fact ,. 
or the claim, that I cannot t ell ( in c ertain c ircumstances ) , it 
does not follow that I cannot tell at all . To say,  therefore , 
that since the experiences somet imes are ident ical irrespective 
of the presence of real things , what we see is the same in all 
cases , i . e . sense-data , is  simply a non-sequitur . To provide any 
r easonable motive thi s  inference need one further premiss , viz . , 
that we cannot find out , one way or the other . For instanc e ,  Des­
cart es thought that we could not find out - we might be dec eived 
by an evil demon all the time . But nobody has ever report ed a 
waking up from our waken life analogous to go to the next room to 
see or to get over the last attack of halluc inations ,  so  we have 
no reason what soever t o  think that it should be the case . Giving 
credits to that premiss without any reason is just as absurd as 
accrediting the logical doubt to the pos sibility of human beings 
flying on their own , and leaves the datist with the non-sequitur . 
5. Even the realist will admit that the phenomenal uses of 
exp�essions like ' seem ' , ' appear ' ,  and 'look ' are fundamental in 
certain cont ext s ;  but such statement s are still about part of the 
world and not about myself . For example we use statements such 
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as "the coin looks elliptical from a certain angle" ,  while "it 
looks round from another angle" .  But why do we introduc e the term 
'look 1 here?  
One use i s  in  "The man down in  the street looks like Jones "  
where I am indicating that I am not sure whether i t  i s  Jones or 
not .  When I in normal circumstanees or even in testing circumstan­
ces use such an expres sion , I am indicating that I have reason( s )  
to believe that I am being cheated , or that it i s  not a real per­
son , or the like . If I have no such reason( s ) I would say (cor­
rectly) "It is Jones down in the street" . 
Another use i s  illustrated in one of Austin ' s  examples by 
saying "Gasoline looks like water " ;  surely , I say something about 
the world, not about me . Nor is  this merely a•guarding-expres sion , 
since knowledge of the external world i s  implied , such as how wa­
ter looks , &c • •  This expression might be used as a warning : be 
carefUl what you drink , i . e .  even though it looks like water , it 
could turn out to be gasoline , becaus e it is not easy to �ell the 
difference .  
Why do I ,  then , want to say that "the coin looks elliptical 
from a certain angle" ? Obviously I am referring to the fact that 
I already know that I am in a special pos ition or under spec ial 
c ircumstanc es . Certainly I am not deluded - then I would have said : 
notice ,  the coin is  elliptical . The expression does not have to 
be a guarding or warning expression , as I am not only indicating, 
that I believe so and so ; I have to be quite sure of the special 
circumstances to use it in thi s  way. 
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Again , of course,  in order to have any significanc e ,  to make 
any sense,  these special c ircumstances will have to be contrast ed 
with normal c ircumstances .  MY suggestion i s  therefore , that the­
se ' appearance-statement s '  simply are used to contrast the way 
things look under spec ial c ircumstances  with the way things are , 
that is , how we de scribe them correctly under normal c ircumstance s .  
This latter notion is , o f  course ,  not the same from cont ext .to con­
text , but in general we know quite well , say, how much light we 
need to get a good look of something , the c ircumstances of correct 
perception , an� we know also that when we single out special c ir­
cumstances we get spec ial effect s .  
Such special conditions are actually not very context depen­
dent , they are pretty consist ent in a good many case s .  For instanc e ,  
the professional conductor o f  visual effect s in a film-team has a 
very detailed concept of appropriate lightning , the ophthalmologist 
has a clear concept of normal vi sion , and even the plain man , at­
tending a sport s game or hunting has a very good notion of hi s 
favorite conditions for observation . 
6. Pretty mueh the same considerations are true of the other 
expressions the dati st uses , such as  ' appear s '  and ' seems ' ; in 
some cases they reflect or are associated with other areas than 
the barely perc eptual aspect of situat ion s ;  for instanc e 'The man 
1 looks/appears/seems guilty ' in which case each has special uses 
Also the dat i st ' s  use of ' seeming ' in expressions like ' seeming 
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to  see ' and 1 seeming obj ect 1 neglect s several distinct·ions of 
ordinary usage . Thus ' seem to see ' could be used, in cases where 
the speaker believes he possesses evidenc e against what he sees , 
( for instanc e ,  if it were my wife who saw Jack ) ; ' see a seeming • •  1 
when I see something which l ikens a ' · · '  to which I am unable to 
t ell the prec ise differenc e ( say , a dummy) , or in cases where I 
see something of which I do not know the proper descript ion/name 
of or mi ss the criterion of ident ificat ion for ( flying sourc er/ 
plane) , to ment ion a few inexhaust ed instanc es of the variety of 
uses these expressions have . 
7. It could be noted also that 1 delusion 1 has no applicabi­
lity to , for example ,  dreams and mirror-images . Thi s is so simp­
ly because the ontological status of  our statement s of these phe­
nomena i s  already given when I tell you that it was in a dream , 
say ,  that the horse ran wild . If I start my statement with ' I  
dreamt that • • • ' the exi stence or reality of what follows i s  alrea­
dy dec ided . Such stat ement s do not form part of my hi story , but 
of my ' dream-history ' .  The same can be said , mutatis mutandis , 
1 . See Sense and Sensibilia , also for more examples , pp . 33-43 . 
of hallucinations , illusions , &c . .  ( B.y  the way , thi s i s  nothing 
peculiar to our perceptual language , an analogous set of features 
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belong to statements that start with expressions like ' I  know • • •  ' ,  
' I  think • • •  ' ,  and ' I  made up • • •  ' ) . 
Are dream obj ects , then , material obj ects or sens e-data?  
They are dream obj ects , &c . ,  and there i s  nothing more to be said 
on that matter . The datist will of course , once more , refer us 
to the qualitative similarity between real and dream obj ects , &c • •  
But , having done away with Descartes ' demon above , note that even 
if I am not able to tell during a dream whether I am dreaming or 
not , it does not follow from that , that when I am not dreaming I 
cannot tell that I am not dreaming - another non-sequitur . How 
do I then tell that I am not dreaming just now? Well , one way , 
Austin remarks , is  that what I am doing now is connected with a 
whole lot of antec edent behavior on my part and on many other 
persons ' ,  and it leads to a lot of consequent behavior as well . 
There i s  no room for reasonable doubt . 
To sum up a bit : They may be rare , but we do have illusions , 
&c . ;  it i s  also true that the "content" of the experience during 
delusions , may not differ qualitatively from the "content" of an 
ordinary perception . But it does not follow that we are not able 
to tell when we are subject to delusions , &c • •  Telling so con-
sists in a number of things , such as that we know the conditions 
and circumstances , and when they do not obtain , there is no rea-
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sonable ground for holding that we are having illusions , &c • •  
Not only are the datist ' s  analyses of these groups of pheno-
mena in error ; but also the epistemological reasons he offers for 
the introduction of ' sense-data ' are misconstrued , the discussion 
of which I shall now turn to . 
EXistence of Things .  
Now it has been shown that , although perceptual errors ,  illu­
s ions , &c . ,  admittedly occur , such phenomena are no obstacle to 
the realistic view, the soft spots the datist polemicly attributes 
the realist ' s  epistemology can equally well be shown to stem from 
misconc eption of the considerations he has been compelled by. Se­
veral interrelated mi stakes are committed ; in . this connection I 
shall treat them one by one . For a start , however , let us get 
clear what the type of consideration is . 
Everyone agrees , I take it , that an outstanding instanc e of 
human knowledge is a correct mathematical conclusion.  This. is  
trivial to point out , but it  plays a significant role indeed in 
thi s  connection . Plainly and shortly put , what is at the root of 
the datist ' s  epist emological worries is that we may perceive some­
thing , say so , and then find out that it was false . For example 
when I said that I saw Jack, told it to my wife , and found out 
' I  saw Jack ' is  false . More t echnically and generally put it means 
that the occurence of the experience which gave rise to my percep­
tual judgment is logically consist ent with my judgment s '  being 
false . This has far reaching implicat ions because it must be the 
case even in the very best perceptual c ircumstances , such as  when 
we , normal or better than normal perceivers ,  look at this  piec e of 
paper in daylight in the distance of optimal vision , it is  never-
theless not -logically deduc ible from our experience of thi s paper 
that ' there really i s  a piece of paper there . Ayer has put · it very 
sharply thi s  way : the stat ement that the paper exist s 
does not follow logically from any statement , 
or indeed from any finite number of stat ement s ,  
which are limited to describing the cont ent of 
the observer ' s  experience . 1 
Hence thi s cont ent must be an ent ity of a different kind from the 
paper for which he finds ' sense-datum ' suit s .  Since thi s trait 
characterizes all our perc eptual statement s ,  which al so i s  said to 
be our , or at least to be the basis of our , empirical knowledge , 
thi s  i s  a reason for classifying it as uncertain . This is  a point 
of logic obviously, as indicat ed alone by the phraseology. That is , 
there is  knowledge which is  entailed by the evidenc e ,  and there is  
knowledge not entailed by the evidence .  The former type i s  certi-
f ied by deduct ive means , whereas a logical gulf separates evidence 
and knowledge of the latt er ; this gulf cannot be bridged and it is  
merely , according to the strength of the evidence ,  more or less 
certain . Unfortunately, perc eptual knowledge fell in the latter 
category . But this  account , he maintains ,  i s  the only one consis� 
t ent with a satisfactory analysi s of perception . 
It i s  not quit e obvious whom the datist i s  arguing against 
1 . Has A�st in Refut ed the Sense-Datum Theory? , Synthese , 1967 , p . ll9 .  
Hi s clause of the finite number seems to  imply that the entail­
ment could be gained by an infinit e number , that is eo ipso , (un­
der any reasonable int erpretat ion of ' infinity ' ) ,  logical entail­
ment cannot be gained , - Ayer holds both that entailment could 
not be acquired and could be acquired ( in this cont ext ) .  
here , the realist or the idealist . Presumably he has taken the 
liberty of identifying a realist with the posit ion I above called 
materialistic . In any event , it i s  fairly obvious · that the direct 
opposite view would be of the type that when we see something , we 
acquire certain knowledge about material obj ect s .  This i s  indeed 
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very far from the realist position ·that I have sketched . But there 
i s  not much value in account ing for how much damage a view, were 
it true , might do to common sense .  Of more interest is  it to see 
an elaborat ion of the point s where and why it is wrong .  Let me try 
to single the central ones out . 
Inferred Things. 
The datist ' s  analysis of perceptual statement s was that , logic-
ally speaking , stat ement s about the existenc e and · presence of the 
paper are not deduc ible from statement s about our .percept ion . The 
certainty of perc eptual j udgment s i s  not based on logical entailment , 
hence our statement about the piec e of paper goes  beyond the evidenc e .  
The exist ence of the paper , the alleged mat erial obj ect , is  incon-
elusively inferred "knowledge" .  
To see a little more of the body of this doctrine , let us re-
member that the datist , in his attempt to avo id the fatal obj ect ions 
to the representat ive theory , gave the answer that what we perceive 
are �ollections of actual and po ssible sense-data , which are things 
or material obj ect s .  But how can the inference then be inconclusi-
ve ? We could in the fir st plac e obj ect that the answer just re­
ferred to i s  c ircular , because the dat i st cannot spec ify which data 
constitute a certain material obj ect without referring to the obj ect , 
i .e .  without saying that they are data of or about thi s  and that 
thing. A dat ist might , however , reply that · this merely is  a verbal 
difficulty , which can be settled by construct ing a pure sense-datum 
language . Will such an answer do? 
Put in what Carnap has called the "mat erial mode" , as Saunder s 
and Henze suggest 1 , this answer is easily seen to be unt enable .  
The problem runs thus : Are the data of experience private in the 
sense that they are conc eptually independent of anything that some­
one other than their "owner" might exper ienc e? Certainly an affir­
mat ive answer won 't work , unless the point of the argument s in the 
second section above , some of which are based on Strawson ' s  Individ­
uals 2 , is ent irely wrong . I said that the identification of a 
thing is conditioned of the conc ept s  of 'time ' ,- 1 space 1 ,  and 1 cau­
sal continuity' .  These condit ions are clearly not satisfied , if 
we only refer to sense-data,  sinc e it is impo ssible to exclude that 
the data we presently perc eive belong to another collect ion of data 
( a  thing ) which is qualitat ively but not numerically ident ical with 
tho se we previously perc eived . 
It may appear that the obj ect ion could be avoided by referring 
1 .  The Private-Language Problem , New York , 1967 ; p . ll . 
2 .  London , 1964 ; Part I .  
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to data as data of or about such and such a thing - but then the 
circularity stays . It appears also possible ,  of cour se , that it 
could· be avoided by denying the po ssibility of identifying things ; 
that i s  to maintain that indist inguishable ent ities are ident ical . 
But in that case the task of explaining what we call perc ept ion of 
material obj ect s is  obviously abandoned . It seems that only two 
other ways of avoiding this obj ect ion exi st . One is  to maintain 
a methodological princ iple of causat ion , that is , not that the per­
ception of mat erial obj ect s requires a causal relation between data 
and obj ect s ,  which would bring us back to a representative theory , 
but that perc eption is  of data belonging to collect ions of data 
and ,  further , that the features and behavior of these collections 
are explainable on the assumpt ion of some scource "generating" 
them. It seems , however , quest ionable in what sense this theory 
meet s the obj ect ion , since how could such supposed scources guaran­
t ee the identity of the collections?  In any event , this way yields 
no epistemic perc ept ion of material obj ect s ,  because hypothet ical 
scourc es cannot possibly influence the perc eption of collections 
of data - it i s ,  analogous with what I said ealier , just a polit e 
way of saying that they might as well not be there . In fact , this 
theory is very like the idealism of Berkeley ' s ,  added i s  only an 
assumption of method . 
The last cour se open , and the one the datist takes , i s  t o  go 
the other way round and say that we perceive sense-data and , on that 
basis , infer the existence of :material obj ect s .  Only in this way 
c an  he maintain both that material obj ect s are collect ions of  data 
and that the inferenc e i s  inconclusive . Here the fact s of percep­
tual error seems to play the epistemological role the datist put·s 
them to , which at fir st glance was a bit surprising . Does percep­
tual error really , then , exclude a deduct ive , an entailment rela­
t ionship? If so , which relat ion then? The dat i st answers an induc ­
t ive . But then , is  this relat ion one between evidence and conclusion 
at all? There are several ways the notion of ' inferenc e '  may ent er 
the analysis of perc ept ion . 
Put more generally the quest ion is : Does "X perceives p" en­
tail 'p ' ? The outline of the realist ic answer I shall argue in 
detail below, runs as follows . Both yes and no , sometimes 1p 1 i s  
entailed , sometimes it i s  not - in any event a general answer can 
only be reached by disregarding the nature of perceptual judgment . 
Since ,  as we saw, for instance ,  that although the converging of the 
tracks was not entailed by my seeing them,  it was nevertheless  
perceived veridically ; and ,  as we shall see , that if it i s  not en­
tailed by my drinking water in the middle of the desert , that there 
i s  an oasi s ,  deduct ion i s  totally irrelevant . 
Who Ze Things. 
The mo st expedient and most widely held , I take it , way to 
warrant an element of inference in perc eption i s  the fact that we 
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only perceive one "aspect " of things . What .we see , feel , hear or 
smell in a perc eptual situat ion is  always .from a � ertain point 
of view, that i s , the perceiver is  in a certain spat ia-temporal re-
lation to the perc eptual obj ect . When I did not list tast e ,  this  
i s  because this  sense is  a little tricky in this connect ion ; it is , 
of cour se ,  true that a certain spatia-t emporal relation holds be-
"Gween a perceiver and the thing he tastes , but it .is  unclear to me 
. what sense it makes to say that I only taste 'one . aspect ' of what 
I e . g .  eat , or what I taste is  conditioned by my position . Perhaps 
this obscurity is  due to the fact that we (usually) " surround" the 
things we tast e - it may be said that , for instanc e ,  the food I eat 
however met iculously I mast icat e ,  always have an ' inside ' or a 
' kernel behind the surfac e '  which I do not tast e ;  or when I am 
drinking , some of the fluid passes down without st imulat ing the 
relevant organs . As a matt er of fact it is  also true that I cannot 
see what is  behind an opaque wall . However , I think it also is  a 
common experience that certain gas ses  can be tasted , and I do not 
see that it makes sense to talk of  a ( definit e )  surfac e of a gas 
in general . A similar difficulty pertains to obj ect s we feel ; 
I 
some obj ect s are of a size that we can "surround" , some are not , 
e . g� rubble and paving stone s ,  respect ively . {What would be a cri-
terion for ' surrounding ' ? No air between the fingers or between 
the obj ect and our skin? What i s  the use of ' no air ' here? ) .  
Analogous to the tast e  above , what shall we say about feeling a li-
quid running through one ' s fingers or between one ' s toes? Further , 
how do we see surfac es of gases , e . g . atmospheric air - let alone 
touch it - or transparent liquids and mat erial s  
1
? There are a 
lot other examples . 
Noting these proviso s ,  we may look at how the perceiver ' s  
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position is  thought to nec essitate an inferential element in percep-
tion . When I ,  for example ,  look at a car and pass the judgment that 
"this  is a car" it i s  said , that strictly speaking I do not perc eive 
the whole car but merely one side of it . As I did not · say "thi� 
i s  one side of a car" this means that I must have inferred from what 
I saw, i . e , one side of a car ,  to pass  the judgment "this is  a car '  ; 
which implies that also what I do not see of thi s  thing is  a car . 
Or when I am touching the car and then pass my judgment , it is im-
plied that also what I do not touch i s  a car , e . g .  the inside of 
the fender , &c • •  
Somet imes 2 this implicat ion is  ·expressed in t erms of po ssible 
or even expect ed other perc ept ions such as that if I walk around 
the car or take it apart what I would perc eive is  already implied by 
my initial judgment . However , this seems to be the less significant 
interpretation , since a conjunct ion of perc eptions from different 
positions will eliminat e the uncertainty of the inference .  It i s  
1 .  Moore felt this difficulty, but did not seem to realize that it 
only i s  one in a series of borderlinecases . See his "Vi sual Sen­
se-data" (1957 ) , in Perceiving� Sensing� and Knowing , ed . Swart z ,  
New York, 1965 . 
2 .  E . g . M.Merleau-Ponty : The Primacy of Perc eption , in The Primacy 
of Perception , Northwestern U . P . , 1964 . 
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thus not at all true that all perceptual stat ement s ar e  inferred . 
Mbre significant is  the int erpretation of the implication ac ­
cording to which a conjunct ion i s  vitiated with the same excluding 
clause as each of it ' s  members above . On this int erpretation any 
perceptual stat ement is  inferred . This might seem to be a perfectly 
legitimate consequenc e drawn from the trivial fact that we cannot 
see both · sides of  a thing ; for example ,  we have to change position 
to see the other side of thi s  sheet of paper . But the above cau­
tions appear highly controversial , and that we happen to be unable 
to see both sides of a coin perpendicularly at the same t ime , touch 
both sides of a house ,  &c . ,  is by no means sufficient warranty for 
saying that we do not perc eive the things at all . It only follows 
that we do not perc eive both sides of a coin simultaneously , &c • •  
The point has also been put in the way that our perc eptual statement s 
go beyond our evidence . Now seeing one side of a coin is  simply not 
having evidence for seeing a coin - it i s  seeing a coin . Touching 
one side of a house i s  neither part of an inferenc e to "This i s  a 
house" although we might say that a house we could not touch valida­
tes the inference that it is not a house . Perceiving things i s ,  
simply, not collect ing evidenc e .  
Assuming , however , for the sake o f  the argument , that it i s  
right that we do infer our perc eptual knowledge , it , onc e more , fol ­
lows that we have t o  allow for the possibility that , say , there 
might be single sides of cars  without , note , a back , other , &c . ,  
side . Or that something might be the one side of a car while the 
other is subj ect to instant changes .  This i s  certainly peculiar . 
Such account. fails to explain what we understand by as  well whole 
as aspect s of things . 
The most fatal failure of the inferential account is  it ' s  
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negligence of the fact that in a huge amount of cases of perc eptual 
claims no inference is  present at all . If an inference is  a series 
of  thought s ,  arranged in certain ways , which has as a result a belief , 
thus held on the basis of the other thought s in the series , then , 
obviously, no such inference forms part of ordinary perception � 
actually I cannot think of any natural situat ion in which this hap� 
pen s .  O n  what I called the less significant int erpretat ion above , 
it may happen , if I am in doubt as Descart es was in his Second Me-
ditat ion , that I sum up for myself that I see a hat , a coat , certain 
charact erist ic movement s ,  &c . ,  &c . ,  before I pass  the statement that 
it i s  a person I am seeing in the street . But note , that even in 
such case , it i s  required that I have a specific reason to be so 
reluctant , for example as Descart es I suspect the person of being 
1 an automaton 
Thi s i s ,  however , not at all the content ion here . What is  
claimed i s  that whatever I see  or say I see , I at the same time , am 
assuming that it has a side which � do not see but which I maintain 
per _implication of my stat ement that I inferred i s  there .  Any per-
1 . Cf . L . Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations , #34 6 .  
ceptual claim I may make , carries thi s  implicat ion , that when I ,  
l et us say , see the hat worn by a person or an automaton , what I 
actually see i s  something black,  of thi s  and that shape , &c . ,  but 
never a hat . Seeing this  hat involves this and the inferenc e 
that granted these things , they have another side , an inside , &c . •  
1 Thi s i s  not true , not because ,  as has been point ed out , we can 
imagine a world in which legitimate perceptual claims were made 
in a flash and always j ust ified ex post facto without any previous 
series of  t hought s at all , which at best might prove that an in-
ferenc e is not a necessary element of perc eption but leaves the 
possibility that , although a cont ingent fact , our perception ac-
tually necessarily involves an inference of the kind referred to , 
but because it simply di sregards too many fact s .  
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Confronted with thi s counterevidence of common sense , defender s 
of the perc eptual inferenc e view, often resort to speaking of "un-
consc ious inferenc es" and thereby refer to _an assumpt ion such as 
that we actually make inferences , but due to their high frequency, 
they are carr ied t hrough habitually or automatically. If this were 
true , they should be detectable by careful introspect ion at l east 
in some cases . Note here that retrospect ion will not do , sinc e this 
process  would be indist inguishable from the account at issue . 
- Now the stronger claim is made that the inferences are made not 
1 .  L . S . Carrier : Immediate and Mediate Perc eption , JournaZ of Philo­
sophy� 1969 . 
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only habitually, automatically, or unconsc iously , but subconsc ious-
ly, that i s ,  they are non-detectabl.es or non-observables in princ ip-
le . Carrier ( op. ait. ) suggest s that a notion like " subconscious 
inferenc es" only serves merely to keep a theory consistent , since 
it has no good independent just ificat ion . The only instanc es of ap-
parently similar type are instanc es of what we remember ; it might 
be said , rightly I believe , that for example a certain knowledge 
that is not at· present at use , is  there all the t ime . The relevant 
difference 
1 
i s  obviously that if such knowledge although occasions 
for it ' s  use occur , is never used , there is  no reason to hold the 
assumption of the person ' s  pos session of that knowledge . 
The conclusion is  that when there i s  no reason to suppo se an 
inferential element in perception , perc eptual statement s need not 
exceed any evidenc e and there i s  no reason , as yet , for the intra-
duct ion of sense-data to characterize this alleged evidenc e .  To 
say that it follows from the fact that we do not perceive the enti-
re thing , that we do not perceive the thing , but something that 
might be called sense-data,  i s  to maintain a non-sequitur . From the 
fact it follows , tautologically speaking , that we perc eive part s of 
things or perc eive them in part , which cannot perplex anybody , since 
it would be logical impo ssible to , e . g .  see a thing from all per-
spect ives simult aneously. 
1 .  Obviously it is  al so true of most of our knowledge that we do know 
or other s can tell us , when and where we learned it , while nobody 
seems to have learned or needed to learn the alleged inferences of 
perc ept ion . I find it fairly safe , too , to exclude that these per­
ceptual inferences as innat e princ iples . 
Bits of' Things . 
Nearly the same reasoning applied from another angle might 
yield warranty for an element of inferenc e in percept ion . Thus 
it i s  claimed that my perc eptual statement· , e . g . , "I saw the cat" 
goes beyond the evidence if I actually only saw it s hind end . I 
j ust said that of course I may see the cat without inspecting it 
all over ; now the quest ion to be examined i s  that although it i s  
true that I only saw a ( small ) part o f  a thing , is it then true 
that I cannot say that I saw the thing without admitt ing or im­
plying any exceeding of my evidence? 
If I should be quest ioned I might , of course , ret ire to the 
position that aft er all I did not see all of the cat but merely 
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it ' s  hind end ; but then add : how could I see it ' s  hind end without 
seeing it? But do I have to ret ire? By saying that I saw the cat 
this i s  no claim to see all of it . In fact to say that , for example ,  
I see part of your arm, but I do not see your arm , is  certainly pe­
culiar ; likewise  to say that I only caught a glimpse of the chair­
man as he ran past , but I did not see the chairman , i s  simply ab­
surd ;  that is , it makes perfectly good sense to say that I see 
part of your arm or a flash of the chairman , though not your whole 
arm or not a thoughrough look at the chairman , and saying so does 
not entail that I do not see the arm or the chairman. I am "only" 
saying that I "only" see just so much of it or him that it const itu­
tes  one · of the �art s of the arm or him . 
'· 
! 
57 · 
Ordin�ily, when I say that I see the whole of a thing , I say 
that I can see as much as can be seen from thi s  perspect ive , which 
means that what I am looking at , is not obstructed , either by ano-
ther obj ect or from an espec ially peculiar angle in relat ion , or 
distorted by the distance ,to it . For example when I see a wall when 
I am standing perpendicular to it , I might correctly say that I see 
the whole wall ; but when I see it from a strange angle I might say 
that I did not see the whole wall . Of course it i s  not always true 
that seeing a part of a thing i s  seeing the thing . For instanc e in 
a different context , say , visit ing an electronic plant , I can see 
the part s of a radio without seeing a radio . Or , a third use is 
exemplified in the quest ion "Did you see all of it?"  direct ed to 
me when leaving the hall of fame ; I might answer "No , I missed the 
upper gallery" or simply "Yes" thereby indicat ing that I spent the 
day reading all the names in the hall . But these are not at i s sue 
here . What is at issue applies equally well to the part of the ra-
dio or of the hall I actually saw. Am I exaggerating or otherwise 
violating any fact s ,  when I count how many cartridges there are in 
a box by seeing their upper ends? - Certainly not . 
Thus , when I say I see the whole thing , I mean that my vision 
i s  not obstruct ed by the c ircumstanc es such as another obj ect , bad 
lighting conditions , &c . ,  &c . , - I am denying that my vision is  
obstructed. 
Surely it is a strange use of ' obstruct ion ' to say that my 
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vi sion i s  obstructed all the time bec ause of the fact that I am 
always only in one plac e at one t ime . For example ,  that my vision 
( of the other side of ) a door is being obstruct ed by my being on 
thi s  side of the door . No less strange is it to say that seeing 
a part of a thing , because some of it is hidden behind another 
thing and thus obstruct my vision , is  not to s�e the thing at all . 
For example ,  that I do not see the door when you are on your way 
om . 
Let me say ,  paying the dati st what ever is  hi s ,  that I from 
some or other bizarre reason would submit to these strange theses . 
It still does not follow, first , that I could not see the other 
side of the door simply by changing my posit ion ; and similarly 
that I could not see the whole door , as referred to , when you were 
gone.  Nor does it follow, next , that I could not see both sides 
of the door even simultaneously - I might place myself in the ap­
propriate spat ial position to do so ; and similarly, that I could 
not see both the whole d?or and you by so changing my position . 
There i s  nothing compellingly important about the fact that I at 
a part icular time am able only to see one side or part of a thing . 
The maj or point against the dat ist i s , finally , that it does 
not follow either from the fact that I am only able to be in one 
plac e at a time and thus am only able to see one or two or three 
sides of a thing at one time , that I am seeing a sense-datum . 
When I see one side of a door or the hind end of a cat ,  I see one 
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side o£ a door or the hind end of a · cat , not a sense-datum of one 
s ide of a door or a sense-datum of the hind end of a cat .  Thi s i s  
so , o f  course,  due t o  the quite general point that ends o f  cat s  
and sides or part s o f  doors are not just that , but part s o f  cat s  
and door s ;  and although cat s  are made o f  skin , flesh ,  and bones , 
and doors , let us say , of · pieces of wood and glass , none of them 
or their part s are of sense-data.  
The unspecified World. 
Having seen how the realist handles all these phenomena with 
• 
ease , we are in a po sit ion to wrestle the conclusion the datist re-
peatedly draws from the classes of fact s I have referred to . Gene-
rally put his reasoning i s :  The naive realist does not think that 
his belief in the exist ence of material obj ects needs just ification . 
It contributes to his naivit e that he plainly believes in the exi-
stence of material things around him , such as houses , penc il s ,  flo-
wers , &c . •  He knows , of course , that people somet imes are dec eived 
by their senses , and he may have had such experienc es himself ,  such 
as  seeing blue rabbit s wearing bathing-suit s during a dilerium tre-
mens , or having made a mistake when reaching out for something cov-
ered by water ,  &c . .  But this does not , as seen , lead him to suspect 
his perc eption either in gen:eral or in actual cases ; while the da-
tist concludes that material things are not directly perc eived . 
What is  directly perc eived is  the spec ial sense-obj ect s - sense-data .  
I should like to develop an obj ection of Austin ' s ,  which I 
call the argument from the unspecified world , because it spot s in 
an exc ellent way an indeed peculiar feature of sen se-data  theory. 
Not ing first that neither 'mat erial thing ' nor 'perceiving ' are 
expressions ordinarily belonging to the plain men ' s usage , Austin 
1 argues roughly as follows the dat ist put s forward the notion 
of 'mat erial thing ' to cover 
the oZass of things of which the ordinary man 
both believes and from t ime to time says he 
perceives part icular instanc es 
such as cups , picture s ,  papers ,  &c . .  But is  thi s  "class" really 
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comprised of "moderate-sized spec imens of dry goods" , he asks , and 
lists  a few things the ordinary man sees , smells ,  or hears , such 
as voic es , rainbows , vapours ,  &c • •  
The point is , I take it , that all such things do not form a 
class ,  they do not represent some single kind of things . Hence 
'material thing ' cannot funct ion as an alternat ive to sense-data 
when charact eriz ing things we perceive ; it cannot even function 
in the role of a hopeless insufficient contrast to sense-data in 
which the datist put s it . He is  misleadingly construct ing an 
exclusive dichotomy between sense-data and material things . 
The dat ist admit s that thi s i s  a point , a point , however , 
which does not shake the contrast he want s to make and which can 
1 .  Sense and Sensibilia , #l , p . 7f .  
be dismissed as rather irrelevant to the central issue by clari­
fying how rainbows , vapours ,  &c . ,  fit into his sceme .  Let me 
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try to copstruct the outline of  his story in the case of a rainbow 
as an instance .  The plain man sees a rainbow, and believes there­
fore that the rainbow exist s ,  he even knows that a statement as 
"This i s  a rainbow" is true . He al so knows that he somet imes is  
deluded by hi s senses , but st ill this does not lead him to suspect 
that he actually i s  not seeing a rainbow. The dati st approves of 
all thi s ,  but even so , he does not admit that the rainbow is the 
obj ect that i s  directly perceived , but is  a sense-datum. The t erm 
' obj ect ' is  here , he claims , used in a ' neutral sen se ' , as to refer 
to a "visual datum" without implying anything about it ' s  status , 
and thus the obj ection i s  shown to be one of mere verbal classifi­
cation .  
But does this maneuvre meet the obj ection minimiz ing it to a 
point of (verbal ) oversimplificat ion on the hand of the datist?  I 
should say no for the following three reasons concerning the dicho­
tomy. 
1. The datist ' s  mistake is  not only to lump all perc eptual 
obj ect s under one heading . The first point I shall make i s  that 
even if it were correct that we do not perc eive material things , 
it i s  not right that what we do perc eive i s  of one single kind. 
Since sen se-data , suppo sedly, is one single kind in the relevant 
respect s ,  the dat ist cannot meet the obj ect ion by agreeing to the 
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speci-f'icat ion of' things perc eived • .  The f'urther the point that we 
do not perceive one of' two kinds of' things i s  developed the dicho-
tomy breaks down , and since this obviously can be done - not only 
into rainbows , &c . ,  and dry goods ,  but also as we saw in the pre-
ceeding sect ions - such a dichotomy is  not worth holding . 
2. However the datist might choose to repeat his argument 
in a slightly dif'ferent form. He might plead only that the obj ec -
t ion and his agreement amount s to establish that the notion of 
'material thing ' i s  vague . Thus he can admit that the notion of' 
mat erial thing i s  hardly, if ever , used by the plain men. And 
f'urther it has very vague boundaries .  But then add , first , that 
the t erm is  not that loo se - things that clearly are mat erial obj ect s 
are of the "dry-goods type" - and he uses it to designat e this and 
1 it s ext ension , such as gases and vapours ,  &c . ; secondly, that a 
t erm is  vague is  not to say that it is  defect ive or even useless 
- to which I must agree . So the obj ect ion is  far from dec isive . 
I s  thi s  true? 
It seems that this  argument will turn out to be destruct ive 
to the dat ist ' s  own position . If' he , viz . , admit s that when some-
body perc eives something , and that it i s  in thi s  vague sense a 
term belongs to the class of material things , it actually does 
1 .  E . g .  Hirst : A Critical Study of Sense and Sensibilia , in Sym­
posium on J.L .Austin , ed . Fann , New York , 1969 ; p . 246 . 
( some ) work ; consequently , the more. work he can ascribe to 'ma-
t erial thing ' the more the need for ' sense-data ' will decrease . 
In fact , onc e he has e�t ered �hi s path , it seems undeterminable 
and followingly leaves no reason for introduc ing sense-data . 
As we saw above , for instance ,  when I thought that I saw 
Jack and it turned out to be somebody else ; or that seeing one si-
de of a thing still was seeing the thing ; or he would even loose 
illusions such as the bent stick ( cf.  p . 3 5 ) , the occurrenc e of 
which has been said to provide the pos sibility of ost ensive defi-
1 
nition of these sense-obj ect s 
3. But I am in an even stronger posit ion as I can say that 
no matt er whether the notion of 'material thing ' is  vague or not , 
the dichotomy still does not bring the datist the cruc ial step to 
sense-data in hand . I can allow the dati st his logical point that 
our senses not only may dec eive us but also that they do somet imes 
2 
dec eive us But it i s  the assumption that we are either perc ei-
ving material things or we are not perceiving material things that 
blinds the sense-datist . For example ,  when I am looking for a 
1 .  Roderick Firth:  Aust in ' s  Argument from Illusion , in Fann , op. 
cit. , p . 257f. Not e my comment p . 81 below. 
2 .  Note one more non-sequitur , that it does not follow from this 
that we are actually at present deceived , c f .  p . 36 ;  and that , 
even if we were so , it does not follow from that either that 
we could not find out , c f .  #4 , p . 37 - in fact , it does not make 
sense to talk of a 'mistake ' if  it could not pos sibly be detec ­
ted and/or corrected , c f .  pp . 27-29 above . 
dinner plate under the bed , I may be seeing a shadow, but because 
he has a single-minded classification , he maintains that since I 
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am not seeing a dinner plat e and a dinner plat e is  a mat erial obj ect 
and I am seeing something , then I must be seeing something to be 
called a sense-datum. But from the fact that I am making a mi s­
take in a perceptual judgment , in my claim , let us say ,  to see a 
dinner plat e ,  it does not follow that in saying I must be seeing 
something el se that I must be seeing a sense-datum - this i s  simp­
ly a non-sequit� . In fact it was a shadow, but it might as  well 
have been a halluc inatory obj ect , a mirror image , something else , 
&c . ,  &c • •  Surely , only on such assumpt ion it would occur to any­
body, plain man or philosopher , to say that we only perc eive one 
single kind of thing s .  In fact as here seen , it was a shadow , and 
a shadow i s  a shadow, which evidently i s  of a different kind from 
both material things and , say , dream obj ect s or illusory obj ect s .  
To summarize , then , it is  in any event a mistake to leave the 
world unspec ified - a mistake that , we know now, is tied up with 
the very idea of sense-data to the effect that there i s  no star­
ting point for the sense-datist ' s  argument . The obj ect ion i s  no 
longer merely a verbal point , but a logical as well . 
Sense and Sense-Data. 
It i s  about time to comment br iefly on the notion of ' sense-
data ' it self . Whether referred to as ' sensations ' ,  'presentations 
of sense ' ;  1 sensible appearanc es ' , ' sensa ' , ' qualia ' ,  ' givens ' ,  is 
hardly relevant to the argument s I am dealing with and offering . 
There are however c ertain difference s .  For instance 'presentations 
of sense ' seems to suggest that what i s  referred to are mental en-
tities - images or affections of the mind (Descart es ) - of which 
their esse est peraipi. 
The notion ' sense-datum ' has on the contrary been thought to 
be void of such associations . That is , using ' sense-data ' to refer 
to the special sense-obj ect s ,  should not imply anything specificly 
about their nature - whether they are mental or not , a substance 
or  an event , or they are something which qualifies certain mental 
act s as a definite way of sensing . 
It has been maintained that ' sense-dat a '  is  an entirely neu-
tral expression for the purpose of evaluat ing the advantages of the 
1 philo sophic th�ories and the common sense view,  respectively That 
is , that philo sophers should have introduced the notion of sense-
1 .  Don Locke : Perception and our Knowledge of the external World. 
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datum for what we , e . g . see of a certain shape and color , and 
leave it an open question whether it i s  a mat erial obj ect or sen-
se-obj ect . 
I think this is  wrong , sinc e ,  as we have seen , what the dati st 
has been most concerned about is  to prove that sense-data cannot be 
identical with mat erial obj ect s .  Why then take the pains of intro-
ducing a notion supposedly neutral as to the philosophic theories 
and naive realism,  and ,  immediat ely turn right around and do away 
with the latter in a way obviously revealing that the dat ist behind 
that t erminology �ot for one moment was neutral? 
For instance Price called ' sense-data '  a theoret ical neu-
. 1 trally express1on , while the cont ext reveals what type of theory 
he was thinking of. He rej ect s the traditional not ions of 
' idea ' , ' impression ' ,  and ' sensat ion ' on the ground that they 
should commit us to the view that sense-data are mental event s ;  
likewise the not ion of ' sensum ' because it suggest s a 'third kind ' 
of status , neither mental nor physical . It is  however obvious , 
1 
that when he introduces ' sense-data ' with the red and round to-
mato , although he proc eeds as if he was occupied with a prec i se scru-
t iny of the perc eptual situat ion , it i s  not in any sense neutral . 
The cont ext reveal s that his stat ement that what i s  perceived is 
a red round something , depends ent irely upon the reasoning that 
1 . Peraeption , London , 1964 ; pp . 19 and 3 , respectively. 
this i s  what he can be certain o� since he also would see that so­
mething i� he had a halluc inat ion . Here are , then , preci sely the 
motives �or sense-data theory. 
The term ' sense-datum ' was �irst introduc ed , I take it , by 
Moore 1 in order to meet the idealist with a not ion that avoids 
the suggestion that sense-obj ect s exist in a mind . Not ions like 
' sense-impression ' and ' idea o� sensat ion ' had been used both o�  
the obj ect o�  the impression or  sensation and the impression or 
idea o� it . To avoid this ambiguity ,  and to make it evident that 
the �ormer , the obj ect o� the impres sion or sensation , does not 
exist in the mind as the latt er , Moore suggested that it be called 
a ' sense-datum ' . But �or that reason sense-data , considering the 
argument s thus �ar , does not c ease to be coherent . 
Knowledge and Sense-Data. 
Let me now return to the epi stemological quest ion . It will 
be remembered that the dat i st held that a person X claiming to 
perceive p legitimat ely may be asked to j usti� that claim .  The 
only way to do so , according to the datist , is by establishing an 
in�erence based on whatever evidence X 1 s  senses provides . Obvious­
ly this in�erenc e cannot be o� a deduct ive nature , since the spec ial 
sense-obj ect s perceived , are independent o� mat erial obj ect s ;  henc e ,  
1 .  The Subj ect Matter o� Psychology , P. A . S. , vol . lo .  
by hypothesi s ,  sense-data stat ement s do not entail mat erial ob-
j ect stat ement s .  The datist instead suggested that the required 
inference must be induct ive . 
But now, the datist argues , since our perc eptual stat ement s 
are mat erial obj ect statement s ,  there i s  a logical gulf between 
our warranty and what we st at e ,  a gulf that per definition cannot 
be bridged by any number of sense-data stat ement s .  Henc e our 
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knowledge of material obj ect s is derivative and unc ertain , whereas 
sense-data stat ement s are not vit iat ed with any uncertainty,  they 
are non-derivat ive since percept ion of  sense-data does not involve 
any inference .  
I have agreed that the po ssibility that l am mistaken or hal-
lucinat ing is  a fact , but also noted that from that very possibili-
ty it does not follow that I at present am mistaken or halluc ina-
ting. It can thus be granted the datist that our perc eptual know-
ledge is  not necessarily true , my evidenc e for perc eiving , say ,  a 
car or what appears to be a car ,  to borrow his t erminology for a 
moment , is empirical .  
But , then , i f  what appears t o  be a car i s  visible , ·tangible , 
audible ; has causal cont inuity , &c . ,  &c . ,  does it make sense to 
say that it (only) appears to be a car? The dat ist will claim that 
it i s  still +ogically possible that I am deluded . I have no other 
answer than : So what ? I am still perfectly ent itled to say that 
it i s  a c ar .  
Fir st , what would the alt ernative t o  the car b e  i f  all these 
things hold true? As pointed out ealier , even if it , for instance ,  
does collapse when I touch it , it does not follow that what I per­
ceived was sense-data . It may have collapsed because it was a card­
board ; it does not even follow that it was not a material obj ect . 
It follows that it is  exactly what it i s ,  viz . , it is  a cardboard 
made so that it looks like a car .  
Next , as I touched upon earlier , although I can grant the da­
tist that somet imes we cannot bridge the logical gulf , it doe s not 
follow that we never can .  His claim that all perceptual statement s ,  
our empirical knowledge , i s  vitiated with unc ertainty, i s  fal se . If 
I see what appears to be a car , it is tangible , visible , &c . ,  and 
further , if I can get into it , start it , drive it , turn it , break 
it , &c . ,  &c . ;  if all this i s  the case , which  mo st of us have expe­
rienced , then , to maintain that it is still logical po ssible that 
it is  not a car ,  is  an absurdity simple and purely. 
The dat ist ' s  point that the relation between evidence and con­
clusion is inductive is thus not universally true . If I can do all 
these things to a car , and st ill say that I do not know it i s  a car , 
is  not only an empirical mistake - it is  a logical mi stake as well ! 
Alternat ively , one would commit an epist emologically quite harmles s ,  
semant ical mistake : one would simply not know what a car i s .  
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( c )  It should be noted , ( 1 ) , that this shows that what is 
wrong about the datist ' s  account is his logic . If I assert a per­
ceptual stat ement , for inst ance ,  "The bathwat er is hot " thi s  is 
not at all a conclusion of an induct ive inferenc e .  Although it 
must be recognized that thi s feels as hot bathwater does not entail 
that it is hot bathwat er ( in all c ircumstances ) ; that this looks 
as hot bathwater does not entail that it is hot bathwat er ( in all 
c ircumstanc es ) ; that thi s smell s as hot bathwat er does not entail 
that it is hot bathwater ( in all c ircumstances ) ; &c . ,  &c . ;  but , then , 
what about a conjunct ion of these? As we saw the datist will say 
that if none of them singularly entails the mat erial obj ect state­
ment , they do neither in conjunct ion , ( cf .  p . 52 ) . This is  simply 
false , for the reason that all the criteria in conjunct ion might be 
sufficient 1 For instance it does not follow from the fact that 
X is  unmarried that X i s  a bachelor . That X i s  unmarried is  a neces­
sary , but not a suffic ient condit ion of X ' s  being a bachelor . But 
if we learn that X is  eligible , has never previously been married , 
&c . ,  &c . ,  then the conjunct ion certainly entails bachelor ship . When 
claiming that no perceptual stat ement entails mat erial obj ect state­
ment s ,  the dat ist is merely engaged in very bad logic . If the da­
t i st can come up with other examples in which he i s  right he just 
proves my point ; while he st ill commit s a logical mistake - hasty 
generalizat ion. 
1 .  Cf . p . 73 , not e 1 .  
( 2 )  It will be remembered als� that the dati st at one stage 
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maintained that there are material obj ect statement s that are true , 
but that we cannot know which they are . Actually this implies that 
we have no ( empirical ) knowledge , at least not that we know of . But 
is it int elligible,  I obj ect ed , to say that some stat ement s are 
true without anybody knowing it? ,  and showed that such an assumpt ion 
i s  uninteiligible i s  case someone knows a spec imen of the opposit e ,  
i . e .  a false stat ement , since thi s  in turn implied checking against 
the sound cas e .  This the dat i st has repeat edly insist ed o n  he 
knows ; so , surely , when claiming that there are true perceptual 
stat ement s ,  but we do not know which they are ,  he i s  making a hasty 
generalization in contradict ion with his own presupposit ion . 
( d) Even in cases , where the dat ist i s  right , that was , in 
the absence of entailment , it does not follow from that , that we 
cannot correctly claim to know. I showed in a previous section 
that we perceive all kinds of things , so let me now pick one of 
the more controversial cases . Suppo se I ,  during an endurance  test 
through the desert see an oasis although my map tell s me that there 
cannot be an oasi s  where I see it - I am seeing what appear s to be 
an oasis .  So my map may be wrong or I am - assuming that my map 
and I cannot both be correct and be wrong . That , of cour se , does  
not decide the matt er ; but concluding therefore that it  i s  impos-
sible to dec ide because I ,  both when looking at the desert in front 
of me , seeming to see an oasis , and at the map , am seeing sense-da-
ta disconnect ed from things I consequently cannot know, needs 
the additional premiss that I cannot find out what is the case . 
Can that premiss be established? 
I may or I may not be deluded. If I get closer and find 
wat er the map was false , and if I find sand I am wrong , the oasis 
was a mirage . The dat ist will however hold that the matter i s  
still undecided since the evidenc e does not entail the conclusion 
- there is st ill a logical possibility that I am deluded in both 
cases . That is  the very quest ion . 
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Suppo se now that I get closer t o  what appears to be an oasis , 
and the sun cont inues to burn in spit e of the palms I see , when 
drinking from the well I get sand in my mouth,  &c . ;  is  it st ill a 
logical po ssibility to maintain seriously that it was aft er all 
an oasis?  Or if I get closer , I come into the shade , the water is  
fresh and cool , there are plenty of dat es , &c . ;  is  it  still a 
logical po ssibility to maintain that it was not an oasis? Well , 
even if it is  st ill logically po ssible , it i s  certainly the most 
silly thing in the world to say.  It is  gro ssly misuse of  language .  
It i s  not even a logical po ssibility . Or if it i s , entailment is  
totally irrelevant . Ironically enough , that is  (now) the delusion ! 
If I on my test wandering meet such a man , filling hi s mouth with 
sand and sand , I t ell him that thi s  is not an oasis and he answers 
that we cannot know dec isively , I shall say that he ( is )  - not I 
1 
am - deluded • It may not be entailed , but we know that that 
man is deluded . 
Obv�ously , ( e ) , even if it Js true that I am deluded , I con-
t inuously put sand in my mouth,  it st ill does not follow that I 
am eating sense-dat a .  MY delusion is  not between sense-data and 
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some thing , but between the "mat erial obj ect " water and the "mater-
ial obj ect " sand. My delusion consist s  in perceiving or having a 
mirage , which ,  j ust like the other things ment ioned such as illu-
sions , dream cont ent s ,  mirror-images , &c . ,  is  not a spec ial kind 
of obj ect called sense-dat a ,  nor a peculiar kind of "mat erial ob-
j ect " .  Choosing either of these would , logically speaking , be rough-
ly like putting a sign acro ss the seeming oasis saying that "This 
is  an illusory oasis" . This has the result , naturally , that it is 
incapable of delusing anyone . For that reason it i s  not a sense-
data oasis , but then , just because it is  non-delusory it does not 
automatically become a real oasis either : since it requires a word , 
why not say that it i s  a mirage , which is  a perfectly good category 
of our knowledge about the world .  
When the datist now compares with the , allegedly , strongest 
1 .  Although Locke ' s not ion of ' intuit ive knowledge ' does not clear 
hi s representat ive theory for inconsist ency as referred to ( cf .  
p . lo above ) ,  he says pretty analogous to thi s :  "we are provided 
with an evidence that put s us past doubting" . An essay Concer­
ning Human Understanding , ed . Fraser , New York , 1959 ; Bk. IV , 
Ch. II ,  #14 .  
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or "mo st certain knowledge" , e . g . deduct ive conclusions in mathe­
mat ic s as mentioned 1 , he finds the relevant differenc e to be that 
_ no empirical propositions are certain since it is  always logical 
possible for an empirical st at ement to be false .  That i s ,  an em-
pirical stat ement it is possible to deny without contradict ion in 
t erms . It has now, I think , been shown dec isively that this i s  at 
best a gross  exaggerat ion . From the fact that I may be mistaken 
it does not follow that I am mistaken , nor that I cannot find out 
whether I am or not . Tbat I may be mistaken i s  a simple logical 
point indicating only that empirical j udgment s are j ust that -
empirical . But that my empirical knowledge ( in those cases where 
the logical pos sibility of error or illusion i s  not excluded ) is  
empirical i s  certainly no reason at all why I cannot have em-
pirical knowledge of what there i s .  To require entailment in all 
cases of knowledge regardless whether it is  empirical or a priori 
matt ers ,  i s ,  as Hare has strikingly expressed it in a stightly dif-
ferent context : 
to succumb to one of the oldest t emptations in 
Philosophy : the temptation to try to prove syn­
thetic conclusions by logical considerat ions a­
lone . 2 
An obvious quest ion might here be : Why not do ( entirely) 
1 .  By the way , comparat ively , how many errors are made in learning 
to calculat e and to observe? 
2 .  In : Pain and Evil , rep .  in : Moral Corzaepts , ed. Feinberg , Ox­
ford , 197o . 
away with logical entailment since , as shown , we do not need it 
all the time , although we somet imes can get it , i . e .  logical en-
tailment i s  not a necessary condit ion either for saying 'X sees 
p or for saying 'X knows • •  ' ? Why should we be int erest ed in 
achieving entailment in some cases and not in others ? Well , 
first , because it is  a dist inct ion which i s  worth drawing in a 
lot of cont ext s .  But next , and no less important , another rea­
-
son i s  that the recognition that what i s  cont ingent i s  cont in-
gent is a nec essary logical point . 
Lastly I want to pick up two things that were only lightly 
or implicitly touched upon so far . 
IncorrigibZe Statements . In contrast to our ordinary per-
ceptual stat ement s ,  allegedly liable to so much error , an ad-
vantage of sense-data theory should be that statement s about 
sense-data , sense-data stat ement s ,  could not possibly be in er-
ror , sinc e they refer exclusively to whatever a perc eiver exper-
iences . The dat ist thus swallows my obj ection above that a lan-
guage referring to unident ifiables i s  no language at all , saying 
t hat of course they are unident ifiable sinc e no two perceivers 
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po ssibly could perc eive the same sense-data,  i . e .  they are distinct 
perceivers sui generis . Only I can have my halluc ination , and you 
and you alone perceived your dream. Hence no way is available for 
others than me or you to talk about and " ident ify" such pri-
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vat e ent ities . In turn thi s implies assuming that you are not j o­
king , lying , cheat ing, &c . ,  a sense-data stat ement is , unlike a 
.mat erial obj ect statement , unretractably true . This is  the so­
called incorrigibility thesi s .  
a. But it is  not true that other per sons cannot correct a 
speaker ' s  sense-data statement s .  Let me show this with the much 
utilized example in thi s debat e ,  the case of Macbeth ' s  visionary 
dagger . Macbeth stat es that he sees a dagger ; eo ipso the situa­
t ion gives us all reasons to think that stat ement retractable , so 
we ask Macbeth �o describe what he saw. Suppose he then says that 
what he saw was a slim cylinder with a red twist ed line on a whit e 
ground . Assuming that Macbeth is  serious he i s  obviously wrong . 
Two ways are .open ; fir st , Macbeth might admit we are right , after 
all it was no dagger , he just made a verbal slip . Or on the other 
hand he may insist both on the descript ion above and the ident ifi­
cat ion as a dagger , on the ground that we of course did not see 
hi s visionary dagger . But , sur ely , irrespect ive of his rather 
fooli sh insistence ,  his init ial sense-data statement is corrigible 
- it was not a (visionary ) dagger he saw. 
In the one case we can correct his verbal slip as we can 
correct any other verbal slip , and in the other , even granting 
t he privacy of his vision , his sense-data statement i s  not incor­
rigible.  
b. Not e further that in either case it is implied that 
somebody is  ent itled to claim that the description in quest ion 
is incorrect . The features list ed by Macbeth do not apply to 
daggers .  This i n  turn implie� that we are ent itled t o  claim 
certain features of daggers ,  i . e .  we po ssess perceptual know-
ledge about daggers .  In other words , if  I say that something , 
for instance in a vision , illusion , &c . ,  looks like a dagger , 
that presupposes that I know how daggers look ; henc e stat ement s 
about the way daggers look are statement s about material obj ect s ,  
viz . daggers .  
This relation o f  presupposition may also be t ermed thus : 
that sense-�ata language i s  parasit ic on "material-obj ect langu-
1 age" We cannot make sense out of sense-data stat ement s per 
se ; the very intelligibility of sense-data language depends on a 
referenc e to common perceptual knowledge . The admis sion of the 
notion of privacy as a characterist ic of sense-da�a fails to 
2 
meet the obj ect ion 
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c .  To find incorrigible stat ements we do not have to retreat 
to these obscurities . Repeat ing the argument of the preceeding 
1 .  Cf .  also William P.Alston : I s  a Sense-datum Language Nec essary? , 
Philosophy of Science , 1957 . 
2 .  As a question of whether common classification allows for ''dif­
ferences in sensat ion from person to person" by t erming privacy 
as 'undet ectable differences ' one eliminates all those circum­
stances which ordinarily give meaning to ' differenc e in sensa­
t ion ' . See J . L . Cowan : Publicity , Analysis , 1965 . Further I think , 
even the sceptic ' s  attack on common classification of perceptual 
qualities on such grounds can be laid to rest ; see F . H . Sibley : 
Colors ,  P. A . S. S. , vol .  LXVIII . 
sect ion from thi s  angle , it is  important to realize that the op-
posite of  privat e ,  i . e . public , does not exclude incorrigibility , 
nor does the nature of things or , if you like , material obj ect s .  
Moore pointed out , I mentioned , that there i s  perc eptual 
knowledge of which it is  absurd to maintain that it should be de-
rivat ive and on that basis be corrigibl e .  A s  such an instance I 
can think of none more obvious than his own famous : 
saying , as I make a c ertain gesture with the 
right hand , ' Here is one hand ' ,  • •  1 
The datist will say that this statement i s  corrigible s inc e we 
can always be made to retract it on the finding of new evidenc e .  
Allow me to c ite Moore onc e more : 
How absurd it would be to suggest that I did 
not know it , but only believed it , and that 
perhaps it was not the case .  1 
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Let us for a moment imagine what , if any , additional evidenc e 
may prove the perceptual stat ement about my hand to be fal se . 
Suppose , for instance ,  that soon after my stat ement , .my hand fell 
off at the wrist and dis solved into dust when it reached the floor . 
Any such obj ect ion rides , I take it , an assumption such as ' a  
hand i s  not the kind of thing that like a soap-bubble - not to men-
2 tion a vi sionary dagger - pops , so to speak , out of ·exist enc e '  
1 .  Pro6f of an external World,  PhiZosophicaZ PapePs , London & New 
York ,  1959 .  
2 .  In passing it would be int erest ing to learn for how long , say , 
my hand has to exist to fulfill the condition of ' endurance or 
persist ence through t ime ' which the dati st attaches to 1materi-
I can grant that my hand which I perc eived would not be a hand 
unless it ' s  existence at any given �ime were logically indepen-
dent of my perceiving it at that time - my statement i s  a gen-
uine material obj ect statement . In fact , this is why it i s  ab-
surd to suggest beliefs or mistakes , and warrant s the expres sion 
here that if this i s  not a hand , nothing i s .  What has to be 
proven i s  not that my hand at some later t ime does not suit our 
(usual ) concept of a ' hand ' , nor that what fell from my wrist and 
dissolved into dust at some previous t ime was my hand - but that 
it was not a hand at the t ime I perceived it and uttered my sta-
t ement . But everyone will agree , I think , that this  strange oc-
currence  actually happened to my hand , and what is  wrong in the 
obj ection is thus the paradoxical assumpt ion that it is pos sible 
and actually was the case that it was both a hand and not a hand 
at the time I perceived it . The only other pos sibilit ies are 
that I like Macbeth may have made a verbal slip or insisted stub-
bornly , both of which we can safely ignore . 
The pursuit of the incorrigible i s  thus not any more success� 
ful in sense-data language than in material obj ect language ;  more-
over , since the former is parasitic on the former , and consequent -
ly must be supposed to be vit iat ed with the same defect s as the 
al obj ect ' .  Note also that the polar opposit e  i s  not 1 not to 
exist in time 1 , but 'to exist £or no time ' - are there any such 
things? To me it seems a rather silly criterion £or sorting 
out 'mat erial things ' from the class of things . 
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latt er if any ,  no reason is provided for the adoption of sense­
data language from such considerat ion s .  
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SensibiZia. From what I have said it is obviously implied 
that perceptual act ivit ies are epistemic . That is , the j ust ifica­
tion of ' seeing ' stat ement s ,  like ' knowing ' stat ement s ,  requires 
that we go out side the persons who claim to see . In contrast to 
for example persons ' beliefs , we cannot give a purely dispositi­
onal account of either knowing or perc eiving . 1 X  sees p '  informs 
us about X ,  but c ertainly also about the status of p .  Perceiving 
is epist emic in that it must be the case that there is a p to per­
c eive ; but , once more , it is  single-minded to allow p ' s  of only 
one kind , e . g . moderate-sized spec imens of dry goods .  By claiming 
that there i s  no p of a particular kind, it i s  not excluded that 
there might be a 'p ' of another kind ; the variety of p ' s  and the 
various locut ions reflecting them in common usage , such as ' It 
seems that - ' , ' It looks like -
have dealt with suffic iently. 
' There appear s to be - ' , &c . ,  I 
To account for this feature of perception datist s  have felt 
compelled to postulate sense-data as exist ing ent it ies , let me 
follow Aust in ' s  phrase in calling them sensibil ia ; in order to 
avoid assimilat ion to the ideali st ic po sition , .  i . e . that sense­
dat a ,  like ideas , should be purely mental phenomena who se esse 
est ·percipi , the dat i st regards sensibilia as endur ing po ssibili­
ties for perception , or/and, most likely , independent existent s ,  
However , to meet c ertain obj ect ions , let it be clear , that 
to dec ide or find out whether there actually are such existent s 
such as ' sensibilia ' is  not an empirical quest ion like , e . g . , whe-
ther there is a monst er in Loch Nes s .  It has been quite suc cess-
fully, but as well quite irrelevantly been pointed out that sen-
1 
sibilia cannot be given meaning by any sort of o stension I 
find such failure quite irrelevant for two reasons ;  ( a )  it is  no 
crux to the datist because there are a lot of other terms refer-
ring to exist ing, things in the world that cannot be attached 
meaning o stensively , such as  'thought s ' , ' numbers ' ,  'rules ' ,  
' pains ' ,  &c . , - even for 'mat erial obj ect ' we might get into 
trouble ; ( b )  an empirical procedure as for example observat ion or 
an experiment are clearly ruled out sinc e any re-viewing or ma-
nipulat ing on my part only has the effect of replac ing one sensi-
bilia with another . This the dat ist can and has to maintain to 
avoid committ ing exactly the same mi stake as was commott ed in the 
representat ive theory ; he may do so simply by insisting on that 
the relat ion between mat erial obj ect s and sensibilia i s  not as in 
t he latter one of 'representing ' ,  but is  one of ' inferenc e ' .  
The quest ion about the existenc e of  sensibilia is  not of that 
kind at all , but analogous to the charact er of the debat e about 
"material obj ect s" above ( p .  59ff . ) ,  it i s  a quest ion whether the 
adequate analysi s  of perc ept ion requires ent ities of that kind ; 
1 .  O . K . Bouwsma : Moore ' s  Theory of  Sense-Data , rep . in The Philoso­
phy of Perception , ed . Warnock , Oxford , 1967 . 
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it i s  a question about the conc eptual foundation of what Hartnack 
has called an ontological language . 
As was noted above , prima faaie , there i s  nothing incorrect 
in saying that , e . g. , appearances or , for that matt er , mirages , 
double-ima�es , &c . ,  are part of reality , sinc e this notion then 
must be given a very restrict.ed int erpretat ion in case all our 
optical , physiological , &c . ,  knowledge about these things should 
be said to pertain to imaginary , phantast ical , art ificial , or 
whatever the appropriat e opposit e may be , activities . Maybe more 
subtle cat egorizat ions would seem to lend more plausibility to 
the dati st 1. s view,  but c ertainly not he�p him much.  
Needless to say, he obviously cannot , on pain of  inconsi sten­
cy, relat e sensibilia to mat erial obj ect s in any univocal manner . 
But then the assumpt ion of sensibilia has some very peculiar im� 
plicat ions . 
a .  Suppose that two persons are looking at the . lighthouse 
simultaneously ; both of them are compet ent perc eivers and the con­
ditions are perfect . Now, by the hypothesis of sensibilia , what 
these persons are seeing cannot possibly be identical as each per­
c eives his own sensibilia , although , by hypothesis , they see the 
same thing .  What they are seeing exist s ,  but by attribut ing the 
obj ect of their perc ept ion to sensibilia rather than to the light ­
house , saying that i s  the ' same thing ' , i . e .  the l ighthouse , lo ses 
it s meaning and simply overcrowds reality . There are j ust as 
many l ighthouse-sensibilia as there are perc eivers .  This i s  
simply absurd . 
To say that because I am perceiving the car from my seat 
and you are from yours ,  there must be t'WO sensibilia , i s  a non­
sequitur . It does not even follow that we are seeing anything 
else than the car . What we are seeing depends admittedly upon 
our circumstances and perc eptual make-up , but this is  an indiv­
iduating feature of perc eivers not of things ; and , of course , as 
we start ed out by specifying such differences , what follows i s  
that you and I are distinct perceivers �nd nothing else . Because 
two ( or more )  perceivers are not ident ical , it does not follow 
that they cannot perc eive the same thing . Nor that they cannot 
perceive it simultaneously ; that does not require two { or more ) 
exi st ent s ,  but merely two ( or more)  set s  of c ircumstanc es . 
b.  But not only does the datist create absurd ontology , at 
the same time he creates  epist emological paradoxes of his own . 
It is , viz . , implied by the alleged fact , that what ever I am 
perceiving is  a distinct sensibilia , that they cannot be other­
wise  than I perc eive them. Since sensibilia do not represent or 
are not appearanc es of anything , they cannot conceivably misre­
present or appear differently from anything . The dat ist admit s 
that quest ions like "Does it seem greyi sh blue? " ,  "How doe s it 
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look from behind?" , &c . ,  are non-sensical .  It has been said : 
If we interpret this as meaning it is  all it 
appears to be and nothing mor e ,  then the po s­
sibility of learning anything about a sensum 
is cut away at onc e ,  for the very good reason 
that we know all there is to know about it by 
simply having it . It i s ,  I think , a very odd 
fact , if true , that there are exist ent s such 
that their being known at all entails their 
being known completely. 1 
Since all we can perc eive are sensibilia , and this implies 
·that we perceive all there is  to be perc eived , it oddly enough , 
:follows that any epist emology is  superfluous . There i s  no rea-
son to doubt any of our senses ' t estimonies - none are veridical , 
none are non-veridical . The conc ept of delusion which earlier in 
the theory occupied the dat ist so much , turns out to be an im-
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possibility. This is certainly, a peculiar implicat ion if anything 
i s .  All we can know, we do know. 
This does not :follow the dat i st might answer ; of course de-
lusions are allowed on my account . For instanc e ,  if you ( seem to ) 
see pink elephant s on the wall , this is ·what you c annot be mis-
taken about , since they are sensibilia ; the delusion consist s  in 
inferring that there are pink elephant s ,  i . e .  mat erial obj ect s ,  on 
the wall , i . e .  mat erial obj ect . The delusion resides in faulty 
inferenc e from sensibilia to mat erial obj ect s .  
This answer does certainly not eliminate the implications I 
1 .  Winston H . F . Barnes : The Myth of Sense-Dat a ,  rep . in Swartz ,  
op. cit . •  
draw. The point i s ,  that he maintained ( i )  that what ever I am 
perceiving it is  an existent of which mistake is  impossible .  ( ii )  
Since there i s  a logical possibility that any inferenc e made to 
mat erial obj ect s may be faulty ,  I can have no ( c ertain ) knowledge 
of them. 
It i s  now implied in hi s t erms , by ( i ) that , if a delusion 
consist s  in perc eiving something which is not there , it i s  impos­
. sible to be deluded . The dat i st cannot switch to material ob­
j ect talk, since he cannot know anything about them ; it would be 
peculiar if he defined ' delusion ' one o� his key-conc ept s in 
t erms of something that not only is  unknown but also cannot be 
known - in which case delusion is unknown , i . e .  unheard-of . By 
the way, we can add , for all the datist knows , there might as 
well be - or at least is it a logical po ssibility that there are 
- pink elephant s on the wall . By ( i )  and ( ii )  it i s  implied , that 
we cannot know anything ( for certain ) about mat erial obj ect s ,  
but all that we aan know ( for certain ) , viz .  of sensibilia , we 
do know. 
MOreover the datist i s  now contradicting not only the presup­
po sit ions he has in common with the realist , but also his very 
own . He , not the realist , start ed out with a problem of perceptual 
knowledge ; next , he argued that the solution to his problem is 
that perceptual knowledge i s  of induct ive nature , and due to the 
gulf there can be no c ertain knowledge of what there is . Now he 
draws the consequenc e that only what we perc eive we can know 
exi st s ,  sensibilia, and all that we perceive exi st s  and that 
our perceptual knowledge about what exist s ,  sensibilia , i s  com­
plet e not by bridging the gulf , nor by induct ion , but by percei­
ving it . Thi s is not merely a peculiar feature of or an odd fact 
about the sense-datist ' s  theory , it renders the po sition ridicu­
lous . Because thi s  view,  that perc eption yields knowZedge of 
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what exist s ,  he started out with ascribing to the realist and which 
he found then called for correct ion . If there i s  a problem of per­
cept ion , sensibilia cannot solve it ; if there i s  none , they are 
not needed either . 
Summary abstract. 
Everything has an end , exc ept some of Leo Tolstoy ' s  novel s ,  
a talented Dane has said , without , I presume , knowing Ari stotle 1 s 
.Poetics . Although I hope the reader will agree that thi s  is  one 
of  the topic s wherein one is  justified in being somewhat repit it i� 
ous to get one ' s point s  across , what follows is  intended to be 
both very summar ily and somewhat abstracted from my prec eeding 
presentation of my case . 
Odd as it may sound , the sense-data theorist finds that c er­
tain common experiences and the ways they are referred to by the 
correct expressions of ordinary usage afford grounds for doubt ing 
other common sense "as sumpt ions" . Consequently, on his analysi s , 
the ordinary views implies puzzles and paradoxes ,  which the realist 
and idealist are unable to deal with to philosophic satisfact ion . 
MY cont ent ion has been I think justifiably , that the main puzzle 
the datist sees in our common sense views is an assimilat ion of 
cognitive and perc eptual activities . Common sense rooms , he says , 
at least two paradoxes .  
The first mistake , alleged on the realist ' s  hands ,  i s  the 
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assumpt ion that perception always i s  a relation between ( a ) per­
ceiver and ( some part of ) the physical world , reality; clearly 
this is not true of all perceptual situations . The next mistake , 
alleged on the hand of realist s ,  is  that sinc e there is  no unequi­
vocal relat ion of perception , claims to empirical knowledge are 
never fully just ified - it is  a relation of inductive , not deduc ­
t ive, nature ; hence no empirical propo sit ions are certain . 
But look, even more oddly , the dat ist turns right around , 
present ing the following dilemma to represent the realistic view : 
either we do not perc eive reality at all or perc eptual claims are 
not claims to knowledge at all , and suggest s the solut ion that 
what we perceive and what our perc eptual knowledge i s  about is  
sense-data�  Int erest ingly enough , he feels compelled to adopt his 
solution on the principle that unl�ss  perceptual knowledge in­
volves a deduct ive relation between a perc eiver and reality , it 
i s  a mi suse of ' knowledge ' altogether . This i s  the same principle 
that he found was at the root of the plain man ' s  innocent pre­
judices and caused the realist ' s  alleged · puz zl es .  
By his persist ent discount enanc ing of the t est imony of senses 
as providing ( c ertain ) knowledge , the dat i st reveals himself mere­
ly to be raising a demand which it is logically impossible to satis­
fy and which therefore can safely be ignored . The more so as 
puzzles and paradoxes pile up by imposing this rat ionalist ic ideal 
on the analysi s  of percept ion ; the expo sure of which I have seen 
as· part of my task . 
Where there is  no problem ,  there is  no need for solving a 
problem ,  and certainly none for inventing one . Another part of 
my task I saw as to show the artificial nature of the problem of 
perc eptual knowledge . Surely , it is  self-inflicted puz zlement to 
think that , e .g . , halluc inations are an obstacle to the po ssibil­
ity of perc eptual kn0wledge ; for to say of an image that it is  an 
halluc inatory image is already to assign it a non-neutral status 
in rerum natura - it i s  not even a visual exper ienc e simpZiaiter. 
Or to think that the possibility of error excludes ( perc eptual ) 
knowledge of "mat erial things"  is an ab surdity , for the reason 
why I cannot , in logic , put sand in my mouth without perc eiving 
material obj ect s i s  the same as the reason why I cannot , in logic , 
speak without using language . 
My aorzcZusion� then , is  that sense-data theory i s  laid to 
rest . Laid to rest in c ircumstanc es , to relieve ·a little of the 
dramatic of this undertaking , which ,  I think , may be said to be 
a natural death of a philosophical doctrine , namely that it did 
not get off the ground unles s one is prepared to pay the pric e of 
absurdity . I should repeat that I have shown so by dealing not 
with all possible characteri stic s of variant s of this type of the­
ory , but with those any of which any sense-datum theory nec es sarily 
has .  
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It · is by now a commonplac e that philosophical mistakes are 
rarely downright howlers ;  they have a point , we gained an insight . 
This i s  true also of the dat i st ' s  mistakes ; I suggest the lesson 
i s  j ust how big the co st is for neglect ing a fundamental dist inct­
ion in our conceptual scheme , the distinct ion between necessity 
and cont ingency. Our award for unraveling this mistake is  the 
recognition of the nature of empirical knowledge and that it for­
c ed us into an adequat e analysis  of perception , that is one in 
accordanc e with both fact s and ordinary language .  This i s  the 
s�thetic nature of p�ilosophical analysi s .  
Revisionism. 
When it is  said that sense-data theory i s  laid to rest , 
s�me may say that it i s  not appropriat ely buried . To indicate just 
what kind of burial I think to have provided for it , let me briefly 
indicat e  what area of the happy hunt ing grounds of philosophy it 
has gone to .  
MY conclusion was , that what is  left for the dat i st ,  i s. that 
to make sense of a theory based on the conc ept s o f  ' sense-dat a ' , 
' sense-data language ' ,  and ' sensibilia ' ,  he has to categoriz� sen­
se-data in a way congruent with the way perceptual experiences 
are cat egorized in ordinary language ; sense-data language as ano­
the� way of saying what is  expressed in ordinary language ; and 
attribut e sensibilia features equivalent with what i s  reflect ed 
in common sense ' s  "assumptions" , viz . , our public knowledge . 
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If a sense-datum theory can be made , which there seems no rea­
son , why it could not be done , that fulfills these j obs we have 
a choice between a sense-datum language and our common usage ; in 
other words , what the datist ' s  function at thi s point is , i s  merely 
to recommend a revision of language . 
It is  a conceptual truth,  however , that it is  against any 
common sense to revi se merely for the sake of revi sion - if one 
want s to revise something ,  one will have to pre sent reasons for 
revising whatever it is one want s to revise . What reasons has the 
datist to offer?  
If  it i s  claimed that sense-data language or theory can be 
recommended on grounds of elegance and convenienc e ,  I do not think 
we have to listen to that recommendat ion , before he has worked his 
sense-datum language out in detail which is  a proj ect ·we only know 
i s  claimed possible in princ iple , but never actually has been pre­
sented as a fait aaaompZi. 
For the persistent dat ist only one possibility is left , namely 
to say :  Well , in my view it is still recommendable to shift to sen­
se-data language because I want to pre serve notions like knowing 
and perc eiving for cases where entailment holds between the "knower " 
and the "perc eiver" , and what is  known and perceived . 
The appropriate question i s  now : What justifies such a re­
striction , what are the advantages and disadvantages of following 
the recommendation? Let me choo se a part icular point picked on 
by the dat ist , ' knowledge 1 , and illustl'at e  what the point i s  of 
such tug-of-war . 
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Suppose the datist has carefully - with due consideration to 
the changes here argued - marked off the dist inct ion between ne­
cessary and cont ingent knowledge and now repeat s hi s conclusion 
that we have no right to use the term knowledge when , bec ause of 
the differenc e ,  we make perceptual statement s .  Notice here that 
some of his work is  good philosophy and that some is  only rhetoric . 
The latter i s  the part where he claims that his analysis shows 
that we do not have the right to use the t erm knowledge ; it only 
shows , if true , that the t erm ' knowledge ' may be put to more than 
one j ob .  
He may, however , admit that thi s was a rhetorical part , but 
then repeat the move slightly differently .  Well , I did not say , 
when I concluded that we have no right to use the t erm knowledge , 
that thi s was an analysis  of knowledge , but that because of my 
discovery that what we ordinarily call perc eptual knowledge is 
different from what we c all deduct ive knowledge ; as you admit the 
term i s  put to various j obs , thus I recommend a revision . 
Two answers are now possible . We might perfectly well recog-
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nize the multiple j obs ' r�owledge ' can be put to do ; but as long as 
we recognize this we do not get into difficult ies or absurdities .  
So t he recommendat ion ceases ,_ revision i s  not to the purpose - it 
i s  superfluous .  Or we can say ,  that we c an  talk about perceptual 
�owledge as opposed to deduct ive knowledge , but recognizing all 
the differenc es between having good perceptual and deduct ive no­
tions , what i s  gained by saying that the one i s  not knowledge? 
Nothing but mere sounds ! That i s  to say,  that perceptual knowledge 
i s  perceptual , and that deduct ive knowledge is  deduct ive . That is 
all there is  to it ; if somebody want s to use other terms he is 
free to do so on the condit ion that he chooses some term that does 
not confuse us . However , if he uses one already in ordinary lan­
guage ,  say ' opinion ' , it s introduct ion as a technical t erm i s  going 
to have misleading associat ions ,  for he may now begin all over a­
gain also analyzing the various jobs ' opinion ' can be put to do , 
sinc e he obviously cannot mix what we now call perceptual knowledge 
with opinion referring to mere guess  or unfounded belief , &c . ,  &c • •  
He may go on and on this way. Or he may at each step invent an 
entirely new term, say ' glop ' to refer to what we now call percept­
ual knowledge , ' pip ' to refer to the unfounded beliefs we now call 
opinion , &c . •  
But now we can see what the revisionist ' s  magnificent proj ect 
of recommendat ion amount s to . He i s  either fooling around with 
sourids , or he i s  willing to risk ambiguity in some t erms but not in 
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other s .  Since he want s t o  get rid o f  all ambiguities he r�s to 
coin new t erms , while agreeing to the common dist inct ions . He i s  
left with new words , merely , for the common distinctions do and 
must remain . This i s  the level of embarrasment , which thus i s  the 
sign on the sense-data theory ' s  resting plac e .  
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